{"id":"F2006B08813","name":"AD/DC3/9 - Automatic Pilot Control Handle - Modification","slug":"ad-dc3-9-automatic-pilot-control-handle-modification","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":52198,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B08813-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-02","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"AD/DC3/9 - Automatic Pilot Control Handle - Modification","content":"---\nmeta-content-style-type: text/css\nmeta-content-type: application/xhtml+xml; charset=utf-8\nmeta-generator: Aspose.Words for .NET 22.10.0\n---\n\n?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\" standalone=\"no\"?>\n\n \n\n![](image.001.png)  Douglas DC3 Series Aeroplanes\n\n \n\nAD/DC3/9 Automatic Pilot Control Handle - Modification NK\n\nApplicability: All models.\n\n \n\nRequirement: 1. Modify the automatic pilot control handle in such a manner that confusion will not exist between it and the adjacent fuel cross-feed control handle.\n\n \n\n2. Figures 1 and 2 of this Order provide a suitable method of incorporating this modification.\n\n \n\nOR ANOs Part 100 Appendix “A” Notice 7/4; OR ANO 105.1.16.1.5.9.\n\nCOMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\n \n\n![](image.002.png)  \n\n\n \n\n \n\n![](image.003.png)\n","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The directive, as presented, does not change scope from its stated object: it applies to all DC3 series aeroplanes and requires a modification to the autopilot control handle to avoid confusion with the fuel cross-feed control. The text does not expand applicability beyond the listed aircraft or introduce additional obligations beyond the single modification requirement and the option to follow the figures or the referenced ANOs. (Applicability; Requirement 1; Requirement 2; References)"},"complexity_factors":["Brevity of the directive: single substantive requirement to modify a control handle (Requirement 1).","Applicability to all DC3 models increases reach but not procedural complexity (Applicability: All models).","Subjective compliance standard: phrase \"such a manner that confusion will not exist\" requires judgement by certifiers/regulator.","Dependence on external figures (Figures 1 and 2) for the acceptable method; those images must be obtained to implement exactly as shown (Requirement 2).","Cross-references to ANOs (Part 100 Appendix \"A\" Notice 7/4; ANO 105.1.16.1.5.9) introduce regulatory cross-dependencies.","Enforcement sits within the Civil Aviation Regulations Part 39 framework, which imposes a formal compliance and certification process (Regulatory header)."],"plain_english_summary":"What this instrument changes, mechanically:\n\n- It requires a physical modification to the automatic pilot control handle so it cannot be mistaken for the nearby fuel cross-feed control handle. (Requirement 1)\n- The directive says Figures 1 and 2 set out a suitable way to do that modification. (Requirement 2)\n\nWho it affects and why it matters:\n\n- Applicability: All models of Douglas DC3 series aeroplanes are covered. (Applicability: All models)\n- Aircraft owners, operators and maintenance organisations that maintain DC3s must carry out the modification or adopt an accepted alternative shown in the referenced figures. They bear the cost and logistical burden of arranging, performing and certifying the work.\n\nStated purpose and practical effects:\n\n- The stated purpose is to remove the possibility of confusion between the autopilot control handle and the adjacent fuel cross-feed control handle. The directive sets a mechanical change intended to reduce the risk of a crew member operating the wrong control. (Requirement 1)\n- The directive points to specific illustrations (Figures 1 and 2) as an acceptable method to comply, so operators can either follow those figures or satisfy the regulator that an alternative meets the same objective. (Requirement 2)\n\nWho pays, who decides, and what behaviour changes:\n\n- Who pays: the aircraft owner/operator pays for parts, labour and any downtime needed for the modification (implicit from the requirement that the modification be done). (Requirement 1)\n- Who decides: the Civil Aviation Safety Authority enforces the airworthiness directive under the Civil Aviation Regulations framework identified on the document (COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105). Maintenance organisations and certifying engineers decide how to implement and sign off on the modification in practice. (Regulatory header)\n- Behaviour change required: maintenance and inspection procedures must include the modification; flight crews will operate with the modified handle layout thereafter, and operators must schedule and certify the change.\n\nCompliance and implementation trade-offs, risks and burdens:\n\n- Compliance burden: the requirement is short but mandatory for all listed aircraft, so operators must allocate resources (time, money, workshop access) to implement the change. (Applicability: All models; Requirement 1)\n- Ambiguity risk: the primary requirement uses a performance-style phrase—\"such a manner that confusion will not exist\"—which is subjective and may require regulator or certifier judgement to determine whether a given modification meets the standard. That puts weight on inspection and certification decisions. (Requirement 1)\n- Reliance on figures and cross-references: the directive relies on Figures 1 and 2 to show an acceptable method and references ANO material (ANO Part 100 Appendix \"A\" Notice 7/4; ANO 105.1.16.1.5.9). Operators will need access to those figures and may need to consult the referenced ANOs to confirm compliance options. (Requirement 2; References)\n- Opportunity cost and effects on private choice: the directive forces a one-off design change to cockpit hardware. That limits the operator’s choice to either adopt the specified modification or obtain regulator acceptance for an alternative; it may slightly restrict equipment-sourcing choices but is narrowly targeted to a safety objective. (Requirement 1; Requirement 2)\n\nNet practical picture:\n\n- This is a narrowly focused airworthiness directive that compels a visible, physical change to one cockpit control so it cannot be mistaken for an adjacent control. It places a compliance cost and certification burden on DC3 owners and maintenance providers, and it delegates some discretion to certifiers and the regulator to judge whether a given modification meets the non-ambiguity standard. (Applicability; Requirement 1; Requirement 2; Regulatory header)"},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This is a discrete, targeted safety directive addressing a specific mechanical confusion risk in a single aircraft type. It has not expanded beyond its original purpose."},"complexity_factors":["Very short document — essentially a single-page safety bulletin","Only one substantive requirement with a straightforward physical modification","Minimal defined terms (only standard aviation abbreviations like 'ANO' — Air Navigation Order)","Simple conditional structure: modify the handle OR follow alternative approved methods","No nested exceptions or complex cross-referencing within the document itself"],"plain_english_summary":"This is an **Airworthiness Directive** — a mandatory safety order issued by Australia's Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) for aircraft.\n\n**What it does:**\nIt requires owners and operators of **Douglas DC-3 aircraft** (a classic twin-engine propeller plane from the 1930s-40s still flying in some fleets) to physically modify the automatic pilot control handle.\n\n**Why it matters:**\nThe automatic pilot (autopilot) control handle sits next to the fuel cross-feed control handle. Pilots could confuse the two — a dangerous mistake. If a pilot accidentally grabs the wrong lever, they could disrupt fuel flow to the engines when they meant to adjust the autopilot, or vice versa. This modification ensures the handles look or feel different enough that mix-ups won't happen.\n\n**Who must comply:**\nAnyone operating any model of DC-3 aircraft in Australia.\n\n**How to comply:**\nEither follow the modification method shown in Figures 1 and 2 of this directive, or comply with alternative overseas safety notices referenced at the bottom (from UK or US aviation authorities)."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-dc3-9-automatic-pilot-control-handle-modification","history":"/api/acts/ad-dc3-9-automatic-pilot-control-handle-modification/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-dc3-9-automatic-pilot-control-handle-modification/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-dc3-9-automatic-pilot-control-handle-modification/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-dc3-9-automatic-pilot-control-handle-modification/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-dc3-9-automatic-pilot-control-handle-modification/documents"}}