{"id":"F2006B08771","name":"AD/DAUPHIN/59 - \"TRW-SAMM\" Main Servocontrols","slug":"ad-dauphin-59-trw-samm-main-servocontrols","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":52090,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B08771-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-02","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE","sectionType":"part","heading":"AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE","content":"# AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE\n\n![](image.001.png)\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nFor the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.\n\nEurocopter SA 360 and SA 365 (Dauphin) Series Helicopters","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"AD/DAUPHIN/59 “TRW-SAMM” Main Servocontr","sectionType":"part","heading":"AD/DAUPHIN/59 “TRW-SAMM” Main Servocontrols 10/2002","content":"# AD/DAUPHIN/59 “TRW-SAMM” Main Servocontrols 10/2002\n\nApplicability: AS 365 helicopters versions N, N1, N2, and N3 equipped with “TRW-SAMM’ main servocontrols having any of the following Part Numbers (P/N) SC 8031, SC 8031A, SC 8031-1, SC 8031-2, SC 8032-1, SC 8032-2, SC 8033-1, SC 8033-2, SC 8034-1, or\n\nSC 8034-2 which underwent their last complete overhaul or repair since overhaul at “HAWKER PACIFIC AEROSPACE’, USA before March 1 2002.\n\nRequirement: Remove the servocontrols and return them to “HAWKER PACIFIC AEROSPACE” for a check of the thread condition and application torque as required in Eurocopter AS 365 N Alert Telex No. 67.00.08.\n\nNote: DGAC 2002-312-056(A).\n\nCompliance: 1. For servocontrols held as spares; prior to fitment to an aircraft.\n\n    2. For servocontrols that have been in service for less than 1000 flight hours since overhaul; within 550 flight hours or 3 October 2003, whichever comes first.\n\n    3. For servocontrols that have been in service between 1000 and 1300 flight hours since overhaul; prior to 1550 flight hours or 3 July 2003, whichever comes first.\n\n    4. For servocontrols that have been in service for more than 1300 flight hours since overhaul; within 250 flight hours or 3 March 2003 whichever comes first.\n\nThis Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 3 October 2002.\n\nBackground: An incorrect torque loading was found to have been applied to the end fitting that attaches the servocontrol cylinder to the upper ball end fitting. The incorrect torque may lead to failure of the threads on the fitting, leading to separation of the upper-end fitting and result in loss of control of the helicopter.\n\n![Signature of James Coyne Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority](image.002.png)  \n\nJames Coyne\n\nDelegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 23 August 2002\n\n![](image.001.png)  \n\nThe above AD is notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 11 September 2002.","sortOrder":1}],"analysis":{"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The AD remains focused on a narrowly defined unsafe condition (incorrect torque applied to specified servocontrol end fittings) and prescribes a targeted remedy (inspection/torque verification at Hawker Pacific Aerospace). It does not broaden the regulatory reach beyond that original safety-focused purpose: applicability is limited by aircraft model, listed part numbers, and overhaul provenance/date; timing windows are precautionary but confined to those affected units. There is no indication in the AD text that the measure expanded into unrelated equipment, broader maintenance regimes, or general rulemaking beyond correcting the identified defect."},"complexity_factors":["Limited scope: applies only to Eurocopter AS 365 N, N1, N2, N3 series (clear aircraft population).","About 10 specific servocontrol part numbers listed in Applicability (filtering the affected hardware).","Single provenance filter: last complete overhaul/repair at Hawker Pacific Aerospace (USA) before 1 March 2002 — a binary condition (yes/no).","Four tiered compliance windows based on flight hours since overhaul plus fixed-date backstops (nested timing conditions).","Cross-reference to Eurocopter AS 365 N Alert Telex No. 67.00.08 for the technical inspection procedure (external technical document).","Specificity of the required recipient for inspection (Hawker Pacific Aerospace), which introduces a single-provider pathway.","Short document with few sections and no multi-layered exemptions or appeals processes within the AD itself."],"plain_english_summary":"**What this instrument does (mechanically)\n\n- The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) requires that certain main servocontrols (the hydraulic control units that connect the pilot’s controls to the rotor) fitted to Eurocopter AS 365 (Dauphin) N-series helicopters be removed and returned to Hawker Pacific Aerospace (HPA) in the USA for inspection of the thread condition and verification of the correct torque on the end fitting. This inspection must follow the checks described in Eurocopter AS 365 N Alert Telex No. 67.00.08. (See: Requirement; Applicability.)\n\n**Who is affected\n\n- Owners/operators of Eurocopter AS 365 versions N, N1, N2 and N3 that have any of the listed servocontrol part numbers (P/N SC 8031, SC 8031A, SC 8031-1, SC 8031-2, SC 8032-1, SC 8032-2, SC 8033-1, SC 8033-2, SC 8034-1, SC 8034-2) when the servocontrol’s last complete overhaul or repair since overhaul was carried out at Hawker Pacific Aerospace (USA) before 1 March 2002. The AD also affects spare-unit managers because spares with those P/Ns must be inspected before fitment. (See: Applicability; Compliance. )\n\n**When and how it must be done\n\n- Timing is tiered by service time since the last overhaul:\n  - Servocontrols held as spares: must be inspected before being fitted to any aircraft.\n  - Units in service < 1000 flight hours since overhaul: inspect within 550 flight hours or by 3 October 2003, whichever comes first.\n  - Units in service 1000–1300 flight hours since overhaul: inspect before reaching 1550 flight hours or by 3 July 2003, whichever comes first.\n  - Units in service > 1300 flight hours since overhaul: inspect within 250 flight hours or by 3 March 2003, whichever comes first.\n  - The AD’s operative date is 3 October 2002. (See: Compliance; Effective date.)\n\n**Why CASA required this (stated safety reason)\n\n- CASA’s Background states that an incorrect torque was applied to the end fitting that attaches the servocontrol cylinder to the upper ball end fitting. Incorrect torque may lead to thread failure, separation of the upper end fitting and loss of helicopter control. The AD’s corrective action is to have HPA check thread condition and torque. (See: Background; Requirement.)\n\n**Who pays, who decides, and what behaviour changes\n\n- Who pays: aircraft owners/operators pay for removal, shipping or transport to HPA (or an authorised agent if permitted), inspection, and any corrective work discovered by the inspection. Operators also bear the economic cost of downtime while units are off-wing and awaiting inspection or repair.\n- Who decides: CASA (through its delegated officer) mandated the action. Hawker Pacific Aerospace is specified as the recipient for the inspection; Eurocopter’s Alert Telex supplies the inspection procedure.\n- Behaviour changes required: operators must track flight hours since overhaul, remove affected servocontrols within the stipulated windows, refrain from fitting affected spares until inspected, and return units to HPA for the specified checks.\n\n**Practical implementation, costs and trade-offs (mechanisms, not judgement)\n\n- Compliance tracking: operators must know the last overhaul date and accurately record flight hours since overhaul to determine which timing bucket applies.\n- Downtime and logistics: removal and return to a specific overseas repair facility imposes logistics costs and potential aircraft unavailability. If HPA is the only authorised source for the required check/repair, work and revenue concentrate at HPA; operators cannot simply use an alternative vendor without meeting the AD’s requirement or getting approval from CASA.\n- Safety vs opportunity cost: the AD imposes immediate inspection costs and operational disruption in order to reduce the risk of in-service thread failure and possible loss of control. The operator’s choice is between incurring inspection/repair costs and accepting the increased safety risk if they try to delay or circumvent the AD (which would be non-compliant). The AD fixes the corrective action (inspection/torque verification) rather than giving open-ended remedies.\n\n**Dependencies and cross-references that affect execution\n\n- The AD requires compliance with the inspection and torque checks as set out in Eurocopter AS 365 N Alert Telex No. 67.00.08, so the detailed technical steps are in that manufacturer document. The AD also notes a related DGAC reference. (See: Requirement; Note.)\n\n**Net effect in plain terms\n\n- Selected main servocontrols overhauled at HPA before 1 March 2002 must be taken off the helicopter (or not fitted, if a spare) and returned to HPA for inspection of threads and torque verification within the specified flight-hour or date windows. The immediate burden is on operators and maintenance organisations (time, money, logistics) while the stated benefit is reduction of a risk of thread failure and potential loss of control.\n\n(References in parentheses refer to the AD sections: Applicability; Requirement; Compliance; Background.)"},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"Unauthenticated. Configure AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY or use a provider module. Learn more: https://ai-sdk.dev/unauthenticated-ai-gateway","source":"analysis-cron"},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This Airworthiness Directive maintains its original narrow scope. It targets a specific unsafe condition identified in a specific batch of components from a specific repair facility during a specific timeframe. There is no evidence of scope creep; the instrument remains tightly focused on the thread torque defect in TRW-SAMM servocontrols overhauled at Hawker Pacific Aerospace before March 2002."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple cascading compliance deadlines based on flight hours since overhaul (four separate categories)","Specific part number enumeration (10 distinct P/Ns listed)","Geographic and temporal restriction on repair source (Hawker Pacific Aerospace, USA, before 1 March 2002)","Cross-reference to external technical document (Eurocopter AS 365 N Alert Telex No. 67.00.08) for actual inspection procedure","Reference to French aviation authority directive (DGAC 2002-312-056(A)) without explanation of its content"],"plain_english_summary":"This CASA safety order targets specific Eurocopter Dauphin helicopters fitted with TRW‑SAMM main servocontrols repaired by Hawker Pacific Aerospace before March 2002. An incorrect torque on the threaded fitting can lead to failure of the flight control cylinder and loss of aircraft control.\n\nOwners/operators must remove affected servocontrols and return them to Hawker Pacific for thread inspection and correct re‑torquing before fitting (spares) or within the service‑hour deadlines specified for in‑service parts."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-dauphin-59-trw-samm-main-servocontrols","history":"/api/acts/ad-dauphin-59-trw-samm-main-servocontrols/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-dauphin-59-trw-samm-main-servocontrols/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-dauphin-59-trw-samm-main-servocontrols/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-dauphin-59-trw-samm-main-servocontrols/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-dauphin-59-trw-samm-main-servocontrols/documents"}}