{"id":"F2006B08564","name":"AD/CIRRUS/2 Amdt 1 - Aircraft Parachute System","slug":"ad-cirrus-2-amdt-1-aircraft-parachute-system","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":51396,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B08564-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-02","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"AD/CIRRUS/2 Amdt 1 - Aircraft Parachute System","content":"![](image.001.png)\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nAIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE\n\nFor the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below revokes Airworthiness Directive (AD) AD/CIRRUS/2 and issues the following AD under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.\n\n![](image.001.png)\n\nCirrus Design SR20 and SR22 Series Aeroplanes\n\nAD/CIRRUS/2\n\nAmdt 1\n\n  \nAircraft Parachute System 3/2003\n\nApplicability: Model SR20 aircraft, serial numbers 1005 through 1195\\. Model SR22 aircraft, serial numbers 0002 through 0209.\n\nRequirement: Modify the Cirrus Airplane Parachute System (CAPS) by replacing the CAPS handle access cover, the activation handle bracket, and the activation cable, with parts of improved design in accordance with the following service information, as applicable:\n\n    Cirrus Service Bulletin SB 20-95-03 Issued June 10, 2002; SB 20-95-04 Issued July 10, 2002; SB 20-95-05, Issued July 10, 2002, or SB 20-95-05 Revision 1, dated August 14 2002.\n\n    2. Cirrus Service Bulletin SB 22-95-03 Issued June 10, 2002; SB 22-95-04, Issued July 10, 2002; SB 22-95-05, Issued July 10, 2002, or SB 22-95-05 Revision 1, dated August 14 2002.\n\nNote: FAA AD 2002-24-08 Amdt 39-12973 refers.\n\nCompliance: Within 90 days after 20 March 2003, unless already accomplished.\n\nThis Amendment becomes effective on 20 March 2003.\n\nBackground: The FAA received a report from the type certificate holder that a condition exists that could cause the Cirrus Aircraft Parachute System (CAPS), installed on certain Model SR20 and SR22 aircraft, not to activate in the event of an emergency.\n\nCirrus Design SR20 and SR22 Series Aeroplanes\n\nAD/CIRRUS/2 Amdt 1 (Continued)\n\nAmendment 1 is issued in response to a new FAA AD, which requires modification of the CAPS activation system with parts of improved design. This action is intended to prevent failure of the CAPS activation system in an emergency situation.\n\nThe original issue of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 27 March 2002.\n\n![Signature of David Alan Villiers Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority](image.002.png)  \n\nDavid Alan Villiers\n\nDelegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 30 January 2003\n\n![](image.001.png)  \n\nThe above AD is notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 26 February 2003.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This amendment updates and replaces the original AD/CIRRUS/2 by mandating specific improved-design replacement parts and citing current Cirrus Service Bulletins; it responds to a new FAA AD. The change is technical and corrective (specifying updated parts and service information) rather than a material broadening of scope: the affected serial-number ranges and the safety objective (restore reliable CAPS activation) remain consistent with the original directive. There is no expansion of applicability or additional regulatory burdens beyond the retrofit requirement and its deadline."},"complexity_factors":["Short directive with focused scope (single system: CAPS)","Applicability limited to two narrow serial number ranges","Single substantive action required (replace three named parts)","References to a small set of manufacturer Service Bulletins (SR20: SB 20-95-03/04/05; SR22: SB 22-95-03/04/05 including one revision)","Single compliance deadline (within 90 days of 20 March 2003)","Minor cross-reference to FAA AD 2002-24-08 but no extensive legal cross-referencing or nested exceptions","No complex definitions, calculations, or staged conditional requirements"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this instrument does**\n\n- This Airworthiness Directive (AD) requires owners/operators of certain Cirrus SR20 and SR22 aeroplanes to modify the Cirrus Airplane Parachute System (CAPS). The modification is limited to replacing the CAPS handle access cover, the activation handle bracket, and the activation cable with improved-design parts. (See \"Requirement\".)\n\n**Which aircraft are affected**\n\n- Model SR20, serial numbers 1005 through 1195. (See \"Applicability\".)\n- Model SR22, serial numbers 0002 through 0209. (See \"Applicability\".)\n\n**What you must do and by when**\n\n- Have the specified CAPS parts replaced in accordance with the listed Cirrus Service Bulletins (different bulletin numbers are listed for SR20 and SR22). The replacement must follow the instructions in those Service Bulletins. (See \"Requirement\".)\n- Compliance deadline: within 90 days after 20 March 2003, unless already done. (See \"Compliance\".)\n\n**Why this was issued (stated purpose)**\n\n- The AD was issued because the type certificate holder (Cirrus) reported a condition that could cause the CAPS not to activate in an emergency. The AD follows a related FAA AD and requires an upgrade to parts of improved design intended to prevent CAPS activation failure. (See \"Background\" and note referencing FAA AD 2002-24-08.)\n\n**Who pays, who decides, and what changes in behaviour**\n\n- Who pays: aircraft owners/operators pay for the replacement parts and installation (labour and downtime). The AD imposes a mandatory modification obligation on the owner/operator. (See \"Requirement\" and \"Compliance\".)\n- Who decides: the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) delegate issued the AD and sets the compulsory requirement and compliance timeframe. The technical steps to comply are decided by following the specified Cirrus Service Bulletins. (See signature and \"Requirement\".)\n- Behavioural change: owners/operators must schedule maintenance to replace the specified CAPS parts within the 90‑day window and must use the procedures in the listed service information.\n\n**Practical implementation notes and trade-offs**\n\n- Implementation mechanism: compliance is achieved by performing the parts replacement exactly as described in the Cirrus Service Bulletins listed for the SR20 or SR22. The AD cross-references an FAA AD for the same issue. (See \"Requirement\" and the Note.)\n- Direct costs and downtime: the immediate cost is the parts plus labour and aircraft ground time. The AD does not state cost estimates; owners must obtain pricing from Cirrus or approved maintenance organisations.\n- Effect on maintenance market and competition: the work will be performed by whoever is qualified and authorised to carry out the Cirrus SB instructions (approved maintenance organisations or suitably authorised mechanics). Because the AD specifies Cirrus service information, much of the work will follow manufacturer procedures; this concentrates technical direction with the manufacturer but does not on its face prevent independent approved providers from doing the work if they meet the instructions and approvals. (See \"Requirement\".)\n- Incentives and opportunity costs: owners face a short compliance window (90 days), which may shift maintenance schedules and impose opportunity costs (delayed revenue use of the aircraft). The manufacturer benefits from supply of replacement parts; maintenance providers obtain work opportunities. These are mechanical consequences of a mandatory retrofit AD rather than policy statements.\n- Compliance and implementation risk: improper installation risks leaving the CAPS unserviceable or introducing new failure modes. The AD mitigates this by requiring work to follow the service bulletins, but quality depends on competent execution and appropriate post‑installation checks. (See \"Requirement\".)\n\n**What this does not do**\n\n- The AD does not change certification of the aircraft otherwise, impose operational restrictions beyond the retrofit, or specify financial support or compensation. It does not expand applicability beyond the listed serial numbers.\n\n(References: \"Applicability\", \"Requirement\", \"Compliance\", \"Background\" and the Note referencing FAA AD 2002-24-08.)"},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This amendment remains tightly focused on its original purpose: correcting a specific safety defect in the Cirrus Aircraft Parachute System. It replaces an earlier version of the same directive (AD/CIRRUS/2) with updated requirements based on new FAA information, but does not expand beyond the CAPS modification mandate."},"complexity_factors":["Single, clearly defined applicability (two specific aircraft models with serial number ranges)","Straightforward requirement: replace three named components using specified service bulletins","Simple compliance deadline (90 days from effective date)","No nested exceptions, conditional logic, or cross-references to other legislation beyond a single note referencing the FAA AD","Only 4 defined/model references (SR20 serials, SR22 serials, CAPS, and the service bulletins)","Short document (approximately 300 words) with clear structure: Applicability, Requirement, Compliance, Background"],"plain_english_summary":"This Airworthiness Directive requires owners of specified Cirrus SR20 (SN 1005–1195) and SR22 (SN 0002–0209) aeroplanes to replace three Aircraft Parachute System (CAPS) components because a design flaw can prevent parachute activation in an emergency. \n\nThe mandated parts swap must be completed within 90 days of 20 March 2003 (unless already done); CASA adopted this after the FAA identified the safety issue."},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"A positive credit balance is required for all requests, including BYOK, so fallback providers remain available. Add credits at https://vercel.com/d?to=%2F%5Bteam%5D%2F%7E%2Fai%3Fmodal%3Dtop-up to continue.","source":"analysis-cron"}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-cirrus-2-amdt-1-aircraft-parachute-system","history":"/api/acts/ad-cirrus-2-amdt-1-aircraft-parachute-system/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-cirrus-2-amdt-1-aircraft-parachute-system/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-cirrus-2-amdt-1-aircraft-parachute-system/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-cirrus-2-amdt-1-aircraft-parachute-system/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-cirrus-2-amdt-1-aircraft-parachute-system/documents"}}