{"id":"F2006L01048","name":"AD/BELL 222/35 - Fuel Valve Switch","slug":"ad-bell-222-35-fuel-valve-switch","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":58340,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006L01048-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-02","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) 22","sectionType":"division","heading":"Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) 222 Series Helicopters","content":"### Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) 222 Series Helicopters\n\n| AD/BELL 222/35 | Fuel Valve Switch | 6/2006 DM |\n| -------------- | ----------------- | --------- |\n\n| Applicability: | Model 222, 222B and 222U helicopters.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |\n| -------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Requirement:   | Rewire the fuel valve switch, part number (P/N) 10648BH1-1, in accordance with the instructions provided in the Technical Bulletin 222-03-171 or 222U-03-96, both dated 11 June 2003, as applicable or later revisions approved by Chief, Continuing Airworthiness, Transport Canada.                                                                                                                               |\n|                | Note: Transport Canada AD CF-2006-03 refers.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |\n| Compliance:    | No later than 10 May 2006.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |\n|                | This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 10 April 2006.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |\n| Background:    | Transport Canada has advised that an investigation into a Bell 222 helicopter incident in the United States revealed that the fuel shut-off switch, P/N 10648BH1-1, failed in flight causing the fuel valve to close and the engine to shut down. Although no failures have been reported in Australia, review of the Canadian Service Difficulty Report database identified two other incidents of switch failure. |\n|                | To ensure the fuel supply is not interrupted as a result of a possible fuel valve switch failure, this Directive requires rewiring of the switch so that the fuel valve will stay open in the event of a fuel valve switch failure.                                                                                                                                                                                 |\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nJames Coyne  \nDelegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority\n\n4 April 2006","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"AD/BELL 222/35","sectionType":"part","heading":"AD/BELL 222/35","content":"## AD/BELL 222/35","sortOrder":1},{"sectionNumber":"Fuel Valve Switch","sectionType":"part","heading":"Fuel Valve Switch","content":"## Fuel Valve Switch","sortOrder":2},{"sectionNumber":"6/2006 DM","sectionType":"part","heading":"6/2006 DM","content":"## 6/2006 DM","sortOrder":3}],"analysis":{"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This AD maintains its original narrow scope — addressing a specific safety defect in a specific component on specific helicopter models. There is no evidence of scope creep; it remains a targeted safety intervention."},"complexity_factors":["Single, specific mechanical action required (rewiring one switch)","Only 3 helicopter models affected","Clear reference to external technical documents (Bell bulletins) rather than lengthy internal instructions","No nested conditions, exceptions, or alternative compliance methods","Simple compliance deadline structure","Minimal defined terms (only standard aviation abbreviations like P/N for part number)"],"plain_english_summary":"This CASA Airworthiness Directive mandates rewiring a specific fuel-valve switch on Bell 222, 222B and 222U helicopters so a switch failure leaves the valve open rather than shutting the engine. It affects all operators of those models in Australia and was driven by similar failures overseas; the work was required by 10 May 2006 to prevent in‑flight engine shutdowns and potential crashes."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The directive is narrowly targeted: it addresses a specific hardware failure mode (the fuel valve switch) and prescribes a specific mitigation (rewiring per Bell Technical Bulletin). It does not expand the regulatory reach beyond that original safety purpose, nor does it add broader compliance obligations or unrelated requirements."},"complexity_factors":["Short, single-subject directive focused on one part (P/N 10648BH1-1)","Single mandatory action: rewire the switch in accordance with a Technical Bulletin","Two possible Technical Bulletin numbers (222-03-171 or 222U-03-96) depending on model","External dependency: allows 'later revisions approved by Chief, Continuing Airworthiness, Transport Canada' (introduces reliance on external approvals)","Cross-reference to Transport Canada AD CF-2006-03","Clear, firm compliance and effective dates (limits temporal complexity)"],"plain_english_summary":"**What the directive does**\n\n- This Airworthiness Directive (AD) requires a one-time rewiring of the fuel valve switch (part number 10648BH1-1) on certain Bell 222 helicopters so that, if the switch fails in flight, the fuel valve will remain open instead of closing and cutting engine power. (Requirement; Background)\n\n**Which aircraft and who is affected**\n\n- Applies to Bell 222, 222B and 222U helicopters. (Applicability)\n- Affects the helicopter owners and operators, and any maintenance organisation contracted to perform the work. Maintenance must be done in accordance with the specified Bell Technical Bulletin. (Requirement)\n\n**What must be done, and by when**\n\n- Rewire the fuel valve switch per Bell Technical Bulletin 222-03-171 or 222U-03-96 (dated 11 June 2003), or a later revision approved by the Chief, Continuing Airworthiness, Transport Canada. (Requirement)\n- The AD became effective 10 April 2006 and requires compliance no later than 10 May 2006. (Compliance)\n\n**Why the rule was issued**\n\n- An investigation found an in-flight failure of the fuel shut-off switch that caused the fuel valve to close and the engine to shut down. Additional service reports identified two other switch failures. The rewiring changes the failure mode so a switch failure will not interrupt fuel flow in flight. (Background)\n\n**Who pays and who decides**\n\n- Owners/operators pay for parts, labour and any downtime while aircraft are grounded for the modification. (Requirement; Compliance)\n- The AD cites Transport Canada and Bell Technical Bulletins as the sources of the specific instructions; the Chief, Continuing Airworthiness, Transport Canada, can approve later revisions of the bulletins that are acceptable for compliance. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) delegate issued the AD in Australia. (Requirement; Applicability)\n\n**Practical effects and compliance mechanics**\n\n- Operators must schedule the rewiring before the compliance date and ensure a maintenance organisation follows the appropriate Technical Bulletin. If operators contract out maintenance, independent maintenance providers can perform the work provided they follow the approved instructions. (Requirement)\n\n**Costs, incentives, trade-offs and implementation risks**\n\n- Concentrated benefit: Direct reduction of the risk of in-flight engine shutdown caused by this particular switch failure for the affected fleet. (Background)\n- Diffuse cost: All owners/operators of the affected models must bear the direct costs (labour, parts, aircraft down-time) to implement the rewiring. (Requirement; Compliance)\n- Implementation risk: Incorrect installation could introduce other faults; compliance depends on maintenance quality and correct use of the Technical Bulletin. (Requirement)\n- Change-of-failure-mode trade-off: The rewiring alters the switch's failure behaviour so the valve stays open on switch failure (this reduces the specific in-flight shutdown hazard). Operators should confirm via the Technical Bulletin and regulator guidance whether this change affects other operational safety scenarios (for example, procedures that rely on shutting fuel off in certain ground or emergency conditions). The AD itself requires the rewiring for flight-safety reasons but does not detail any compensating procedural changes. (Requirement; Background)\n\n**Cross-reference**\n\n- The AD references Transport Canada AD CF-2006-03 and the Bell Technical Bulletins named above as the detailed method of compliance. (Requirement; Note)\n\n(Section references in parentheses refer to the AD text headings: Applicability; Requirement; Compliance; Background.)"},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"Unauthenticated. Configure AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY or use a provider module. Learn more: https://ai-sdk.dev/unauthenticated-ai-gateway","source":"analysis-cron"}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-bell-222-35-fuel-valve-switch","history":"/api/acts/ad-bell-222-35-fuel-valve-switch/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-bell-222-35-fuel-valve-switch/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-bell-222-35-fuel-valve-switch/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-bell-222-35-fuel-valve-switch/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-bell-222-35-fuel-valve-switch/documents"}}