{"id":"F2006B03915","name":"AD/BEECH 400/13 - Spoiler Control Push Rod","slug":"ad-beech-400-13-spoiler-control-push-rod","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":43524,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B03915-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-02","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"AD/BEECH 400/13 - Spoiler Control Push Rod","content":"COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nBeechcraft 400 Series Aeroplanes\n\nAD/BEECH 400/13 Spoiler Control Push Rod 3/96\n\nApplicability: Model 400A aircraft, with serial numbers RK-1 through RK-96.\n\nRequirement: Perform a detailed visual inspection to verify if the securing rivet is installed on the control push rods of the spoiler flight control system, and an inspection to verify if the jam nut is secure on the opposite rod end, in accordance with Beechcraft Safety Communique 400A-113.\n\nNote. FAA AD 95-25-05 Amdt 39-9450 refers.\n\nCompliance: Within 50 hours time in service after 29 February 1996.\n\nBackground: The FAA received a report of a loss of roll control on the co-pilot's control wheel shortly after take-off. An investigation revealed that this loss of control was due to a rivet missing from the spoiler control push rod.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This is a discrete, targeted safety directive addressing a specific mechanical defect in a specific aircraft model. It has not expanded beyond its original purpose of mandating inspection for a known safety hazard."},"complexity_factors":["Very short document (under 200 words)","Only one defined applicability criterion (serial number range)","Single, clear inspection requirement with two specific checks","No nested exceptions or conditional logic","One cross-reference to FAA directive and manufacturer communique (standard aviation practice)","Simple compliance deadline (50 hours time in service)"],"plain_english_summary":"This is an **Airworthiness Directive** — essentially a mandatory safety order for aircraft owners and operators.\n\n**What it does:**\nOrders owners of specific Beechcraft 400A aeroplanes to inspect the spoiler control system. Mechanics must check two things:\n- Whether a securing rivet is present on the control push rods\n- Whether a jam nut is tight on the opposite end of the rod\n\n**Who it affects:**\nOwners and operators of Beechcraft Model 400A aircraft with serial numbers RK-1 through RK-96 (96 specific aircraft).\n\n**Why it matters:**\nThe FAA (American aviation regulator) discovered that a missing rivet caused a pilot to lose roll control (the ability to bank the aircraft left or right) right after take-off. This is extremely dangerous — loss of roll control near the ground can cause a crash. The directive forces inspection and repair before the problem causes an accident.\n\n**When it had to be done:**\nWithin 50 hours of flying time after 29 February 1996.\n\n**Key point:** This directive references an American safety notice (Beechcraft Safety Communique 400A-113) and an FAA Airworthiness Directive (95-25-05), showing how Australian aviation safety law often adopts or mirrors US standards."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The directive's scope is confined to the specified Model 400A serial numbers and requires inspection of the spoiler control push rod rivet and opposite jam nut within a stated timeframe. The source text identifies the AD as a direct response to a reported loss of roll control caused by a missing rivet (Background), and the Requirement and Applicability sections implement that response without expanding or narrowing the set of actions or the affected fleet beyond what is stated. Therefore the scope, as stated in the instrument, does not show a change from the described intent in the source text."},"complexity_factors":["Narrow applicability limited to Model 400A serial RK-1 through RK-96 (Applicability)","Single technical action required: a detailed visual inspection of specified hardware (Requirement)","Mandatory compliance timeframe that concentrates implementation into a defined short window (Compliance)","Procedural details and any corrective actions are delegated to an external document (Beechcraft Safety Communique 400A-113), requiring users to consult and follow that guidance (Requirement)","Cross-reference to an FAA AD may require operators to reconcile multiple documents (Note)"],"plain_english_summary":"This AD mandates a one-time detailed visual inspection of spoiler flight-control push rods on Beechcraft Model 400A (serials RK‑1 through RK‑96) to verify the securing rivet is installed and the opposite jam nut is secure, performed per Beechcraft Safety Communique 400A‑113. Compliance is required within 50 hours time‑in‑service after 29 February 1996.\n\nIssued after a reported post‑takeoff loss of roll control from a missing rivet, the measure shifts inspection and repair costs to owners/operators and targets that specific failure risk."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-beech-400-13-spoiler-control-push-rod","history":"/api/acts/ad-beech-400-13-spoiler-control-push-rod/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-beech-400-13-spoiler-control-push-rod/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-beech-400-13-spoiler-control-push-rod/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-beech-400-13-spoiler-control-push-rod/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-beech-400-13-spoiler-control-push-rod/documents"}}