{"id":"F2006B03529","name":"AD/BAe 146/81 - Pacific Scientific Fire Bottle Wiring","slug":"ad-bae-146-81-pacific-scientific-fire-bottle-wiring","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":43096,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B03529-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE","sectionType":"part","heading":"AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE","content":"# AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE\n\n![](image.002.png)\n\n![](image.002.png)  \nFor the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"AD/BAe 146/81 Pacific Scientific Fire Bo","sectionType":"part","heading":"AD/BAe 146/81 Pacific Scientific Fire Bottle Wiring 12/2000","content":"# AD/BAe 146/81 Pacific Scientific Fire Bottle Wiring 12/2000\n\nDM\n\nApplicability: Avro 146-RJ series aeroplanes with modification HCM01582A or HCM01582B or HCM36192A or HCM36192B incorporated.\n\nRequirement: 1. Carry out a continuity check of the wiring of the eight fire bottles located on engines 1, 2, 3, 4 and the fire bottle located on the Auxiliary Power Unit in accordance with BAE Systems (Operations) Limited BAe 146 Series/Avro 146-RJ Series Aircraft Inspection Service Bulletin ISB.26-60 dated 4 September 2000.\n\n2. Modify the fire extinguisher bottle wiring in accordance with either BAE Systems SB.26-60-01688A or 26-61-36226A.\n\nNote: These actions have been classified as mandatory by the CAA(UK).\n\nCompliance: For Requirement 1 - Before 4 December 2000 and thereafter immediately following any maintenance affecting extinguisher bottle wiring (including complete engine changes) until either BAE Systems SB.26-60-01688A or 26-61-36226A is embodied.\n\nFor Requirement 2 \\- Before 4 September 2001.\n\nThis Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 18 October 2000.\n\nBackground: BAE Systems has received a report of the wiring on engine No 4 outboard fire bottle terminals (WB14) being reversed, rendering the fire bottle unserviceable. This Directive requires checking of the fire bottle wiring until modifications are incorporated.\n\n![Signature of Eugene Paul Holzapfel, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.](image.003.png)  \n\nEugene Paul Holzapfel\n\nDelegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 9 October 2000\n\n![](image.002.png)  \n\nThe above AD is notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 18 October 2000.","sortOrder":1}],"analysis":{"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"A positive credit balance is required for all requests, including BYOK, so fallback providers remain available. Add credits at https://vercel.com/d?to=%2F%5Bteam%5D%2F%7E%2Fai%3Fmodal%3Dtop-up to continue.","source":"analysis-cron"},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This Airworthiness Directive maintains its original narrow scope — addressing a specific wiring fault in fire suppression systems on a particular aircraft type. The document remains focused on the single safety issue identified in the background section without expansion into broader regulatory matters."},"complexity_factors":["Single, clearly defined applicability criterion (four specific modification numbers)","Two straightforward requirements with explicit deadlines","Minimal cross-referencing (only to specific BAE Systems service bulletins)","No nested conditions or exceptions","Plain language background section explaining the safety risk","Short document (approximately 250 words of substantive text)"],"plain_english_summary":"The Civil Aviation Safety Authority has issued a safety order for Avro 146‑RJ aircraft with certain modifications after finding reversed wiring on engine fire‑bottle actuators that can prevent suppression from operating. Operators must inspect fire bottles immediately (and after any fire‑system maintenance) and implement a permanent wiring correction by specified deadlines. It affects operators of modified 146‑RJ aircraft and prevents silent failure of critical engine fire suppression systems."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This AD is narrowly corrective: it targets a specific unsafe wiring condition on a defined subset of Avro 146‑RJ aircraft and prescribes inspection and modification actions to correct that condition. It does not broaden obligations beyond the stated safety remedy (no new regulatory areas or additional aircraft types are swept in), nor does it add open‑ended powers or ongoing regulatory programmes. The AD replaces a temporary recurring inspection obligation with a required permanent modification on a set timetable; that is an expected progression for a safety AD and does not represent a significant change of scope from the instrument’s original safety purpose."},"complexity_factors":["Short, focused AD with limited scope (single technical issue affecting fire bottle wiring)","Clear applicability limited to Avro 146‑RJ aircraft with four specific modification codes (HCM01582A/B, HCM36192A/B)","Two principal actions only: recurring continuity checks and a single permanent re‑wiring modification","Two external cross‑references to BAE documents (ISB.26-60 and SB.26-60-01688A or 26-61-36226A) that operators must obtain and follow","Conditional recurrence: inspections required after any maintenance affecting extinguisher wiring (including complete engine changes) until modification embodied","Two deadline dates for compliance (check deadline and modification deadline) adding scheduling constraints","Relatively few defined terms and no nested exceptions or multiple competing pathways"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this instrument does (mechanically)**\n\n- This is an Airworthiness Directive (AD) issued by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority delegate that imposes mandatory maintenance actions on a defined set of aircraft (see \"Applicability\").\n- It requires two things: (Requirement)\n  - 1) immediate and recurring electrical continuity checks of the wiring for eight engine fire bottles and the APU (auxiliary power unit) fire bottle, using the procedures in BAE Systems Inspection Service Bulletin ISB.26-60 dated 4 September 2000; and\n  - 2) a permanent re‑wiring modification carried out in accordance with one of two BAE Systems Service Bulletins (SB.26-60-01688A or 26-61-36226A).\n- Timing (Compliance):\n  - The continuity check must be done before 4 December 2000 and again immediately after any maintenance that could affect the extinguisher wiring (including complete engine changes) until the re‑wiring modification is embodied.\n  - The re‑wiring modification must be completed before 4 September 2001.\n- The AD took effect on 18 October 2000. (See \"Compliance\", \"Requirement\", \"Applicability\", \"Effective date\".)\n\n**Who this affects**\n\n- Aircraft operators and maintenance organisations responsible for Avro 146‑RJ series aeroplanes that have one of these modifications fitted: HCM01582A, HCM01582B, HCM36192A, or HCM36192B. (Applicability)\n- Technicians who perform wiring checks, engine changes or the specified service bulletin modifications. (Requirement/Compliance)\n\n**Why the AD was issued (official rationale and mechanical test)**\n\n- BAE Systems reported a case where the wiring on the outboard fire bottle terminals for engine No. 4 (terminal WB14) was reversed, which made that bottle unserviceable during a fire condition. The AD requires checks and a permanent wiring correction to remove the unsafe condition. (Background)\n\n**Who pays, who decides, and what changes in behaviour**\n\n- Who pays: aircraft operators bear the cost of the continuity checks, any corrective work found by those checks, and the permanent re‑wiring modification. If operators use third‑party maintenance organisations, those organisations will carry out (and charge for) the work. (Requirement; Compliance)\n- Who decides: the AD (an administrative order) sets the mandatory actions and deadlines; operators/maintenance organisations decide how to schedule and execute the checks and modifications, provided they follow the referenced BAE procedures. (Requirement; Compliance)\n- Behavioural change required: operators must perform immediate and recurring wiring continuity checks until they fit the modification, avoid flying with unserviceable bottles due to reversed wiring, and plan for aircraft downtime to implement the permanent SB modification. (Requirement; Compliance)\n\n**Costs, incentives and trade‑offs**\n\n- Direct costs and time: recurring inspections until the modification is embodied, potential corrective repairs if wiring faults are found, labour and parts to implement the service bulletin modification, and aircraft downtime while work is done (Compliance; Requirement).\n- Incentives: operators are legally required to comply to keep the aircraft airworthy; that creates an incentive to prioritise embodiment of the permanent SB modification to avoid repeated checks and reduce operational disruption (Compliance).\n- Trade‑offs and opportunity cost: choosing to defer the permanent modification keeps recurring inspection costs and operational risk; electing early embodiment concentrates up‑front expenditure and downtime but removes the need for repeated checks (Compliance; Requirement).\n\n**Implementation risks and compliance burden**\n\n- The AD cross‑references BAE service/inspection bulletins for the inspection and modification procedures. Operators must have access to and correctly follow those external documents; any ambiguity or supply delay in parts/materials referenced in the SBs could delay compliance. (Requirement)\n- There is an ongoing compliance burden until modification is embodied: inspections are required after any maintenance affecting the wiring (including engine changes). That creates a conditional task that maintenance planners must track. (Compliance)\n\n**Effects on private markets and concentration of benefits**\n\n- Maintenance providers and BAE Systems (the originator of the service bulletins) will perform the modification and inspection work; this creates demand (concentrated benefit) for parts and labour supplied by those providers. The AD does not itself mandate specific suppliers beyond referencing the BAE procedures, but operators are likely to use authorised maintenance organisations or the manufacturer’s instructions. (Requirement)\n\n**Net mechanical effect**\n\n- The AD aims to eliminate the safety risk caused by reversed fire bottle wiring by forcing inspection until the wiring is permanently corrected; it substitutes recurring inspection obligations for a one‑time mandated modification within a set timetable. (Background; Requirement; Compliance)\n\n**Source notes**\n\n- All procedural detail is contained in the BAE inspection and service bulletins cited in the AD; the AD makes those bulletins mandatory for the affected fleet. (Requirement)\n\n"}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-bae-146-81-pacific-scientific-fire-bottle-wiring","history":"/api/acts/ad-bae-146-81-pacific-scientific-fire-bottle-wiring/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-bae-146-81-pacific-scientific-fire-bottle-wiring/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-bae-146-81-pacific-scientific-fire-bottle-wiring/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-bae-146-81-pacific-scientific-fire-bottle-wiring/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-bae-146-81-pacific-scientific-fire-bottle-wiring/documents"}}