{"id":"F2006B03445","name":"AD/B767/92 - Main Battery Shunt and Ground Stud","slug":"ad-b767-92-main-battery-shunt-and-ground-stud","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":42999,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B03445-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"AD/B767/92 - Main Battery Shunt and Ground Stud","content":"COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nBoeing 767 Series Aeroplanes\n\nAD/B767/92 Main Battery Shunt and Ground Stud 12/96\n\nDM\n\nApplicability: This Directive is applicable to Model 767 series aeroplanes listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 767-24A0112 Revision 1 dated 8 August 1996.\n\nRequirement: 1. Perform an inspection of the main battery shunt in accordance with ASB 767- 24A0112 Revision 1.\n\n    2. Perform an inspection of the of the main battery ground stud in accordance with ASB 767-24A0112 Revision 1.\n\n    3. Rectify any discrepancies detected during the Requirement 1 and 2 inspections in accordance with the procedures in the ASB.\n\nNote: FAA AD 96-19-10 Amdt 39-9757 refers.\n\nCompliance: For Requirements 1 and 2 \\- Unless previously accomplished, prior to 16 November 1996.\n\nFor Requirement 3 \\- Before further flight.\n\nThis Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 9 October 1996.\n\nBackground: The FAA has received reports indicating that interruptions of electrical power have occurred during flight, which resulted in the loss of battery power to the hot battery bus (HBB) on a Boeing 767 aeroplane. The HBB is the source of standby power for the aircraft and its loss could affect several aircraft systems during standby operations.\n\nInvestigations have revealed that power interruptions may have been caused by improper assembly of fasteners on the studs, cracked shunts, corroded or contaminated fasteners or improper torque of the fasteners. Loose fasteners on the shunt studs can create an open circuit or high resistance in the main battery ground stud connection which can cause an interruption to the battery charger and loss of the HBB.\n\nActions specified by this Directive are designed to rectify this unsafe condition.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This is a targeted safety directive addressing a specific electrical fault in a specific aircraft model. It has not expanded beyond its original purpose of ensuring battery connection integrity on Boeing 767 aircraft."},"complexity_factors":["Very short document (under 300 words)","Only 3 defined requirements with clear sequential numbering","Single cross-reference to FAA AD 96-19-10 (informational only)","No nested exceptions or conditional logic—straightforward 'inspect and fix' mandate","Simple applicability test (specific Boeing model series + specific service bulletin)","Clear compliance dates with no alternative methods or escalations"],"plain_english_summary":"This Australian Airworthiness Directive mandates inspection of the Boeing 767 main battery shunt and main battery ground stud to check for loose or corroded fasteners. It affects operators of 767s covered by the referenced Boeing service bulletin and requires any defects be repaired before flight, with inspections due by 16 November 1996.  \n\nThe action prevents loss of hot battery bus power to critical backup systems, addressing a safety risk to essential electrical and standby functions."},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"A positive credit balance is required for all requests, including BYOK, so fallback providers remain available. Add credits at https://vercel.com/d?to=%2F%5Bteam%5D%2F%7E%2Fai%3Fmodal%3Dtop-up to continue.","source":"analysis-cron"},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The Directive's scope aligns with its stated intent: it targets main battery shunt and ground stud defects on Boeing 767s identified in Boeing ASB 767-24A0112 Revision 1 and mandates inspection and rectification. It does not expand beyond the ASB-listed models or the specified battery components; compliance deadlines and the before-flight repair requirement are consistent with the Directive's safety-focused objective (Applicability; Requirement; Compliance)."},"complexity_factors":["Dependency on an external technical document (Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-24A0112 Revision 1) to specify inspection and repair procedures (Applicability; Requirement).","Safety-critical system focus: inspections target the main battery shunt and main battery ground stud whose failure can interrupt the hot battery bus (Background).","Clear compliance timing that creates operational pressure: inspections required by a calendar date and repairs required before further flight (Compliance; Requirement 3).","Model-specific scope: applies only to Boeing 767 series aeroplanes listed in the ASB, requiring operators to check applicability (Applicability).","Cross-reference to FAA AD 96-19-10, requiring coordination or alignment with overseas regulatory action (Note).","Technical causes listed (improperly assembled fasteners, cracked shunts, corrosion, improper torque) mean inspections may require skilled maintenance, parts replacement, and torque verification (Background).","Potential immediate operational impact: the 'before further flight' rectification requirement can ground aircraft until defects are fixed (Requirement 3; Compliance)."],"plain_english_summary":"This Airworthiness Directive requires operators of Boeing 767 aeroplanes listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767‑24A0112 Revision 1 to inspect the main battery shunt and the main battery ground stud and to fix any defects using the ASB procedures. It is intended to prevent loss of the hot battery bus caused by loose, cracked, corroded or improperly torqued fasteners. Operators must complete inspections by the stated deadline and repair any faults before further flight."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-b767-92-main-battery-shunt-and-ground-stud","history":"/api/acts/ad-b767-92-main-battery-shunt-and-ground-stud/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-b767-92-main-battery-shunt-and-ground-stud/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-b767-92-main-battery-shunt-and-ground-stud/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-b767-92-main-battery-shunt-and-ground-stud/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-b767-92-main-battery-shunt-and-ground-stud/documents"}}