{"id":"F2006B03441","name":"AD/B767/89 Amdt 1 - Thrust Reverser Control System Operational Checks","slug":"ad-b767-89-amdt-1-thrust-reverser-control-system-operational-checks","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":42995,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B03441-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"AD/B767/89 Amdt 1 - Thrust Reverser Control System Operational Checks","content":"![](image.001.png)\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nAIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE\n\nFor the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below revokes Airworthiness Directive (AD) AD/B767/89 and issues the following AD under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.\n\n![](image.001.png)\n\nBoeing 767 Series Aeroplanes\n\nAD/B767/89\n\nAmdt 1\n\n  \n\nThrust Reverser Control System Operational Checks\n\n  \n11/2002\n\nApplicability: All Boeing 767 series aeroplanes powered by Pratt and Whitney JTD9D-7R4 series engines, or General Electric CF6-80A series engines, incorporating Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0061 Revision 4 or 767-78-0060 Revision 4 respectively.\n\nRequirement: 1. Carry out a functional test of the thrust reverser synch- lock system that satisfies the intent of the test specified in FAA AD 94-16-03 paragraph (e).\n\n    2. Repeat Requirement 1 functional test.\n\n    3. a. If any discrepancy is found during any functional test required by Requirement 1 or 2, correct the discrepancy in accordance with approved maintenance data; OR\n    b. Operate the aeroplane in accordance with the conditions and limitations of the Minimum Equipment List (MEL), applicable to the registration mark of the aeroplane, provided the MEL only approves dispatch with:\n\n    no more than one thrust reverser on the aeroplane inoperative; and\n\n    ii. no synch- lock on the aeroplane is in an unlocked position; and\n\n    iii. the thrust reverser is deactivated in accordance with approved maintenance data.\n\n    c. If the aeroplane is operated in accordance with Requirement 3 (b), correct the discrepancies found as required by Requirement 3(a).\n\n    d. Repeat the functional test required by Requirement 1 or 2, as applicable, after correction of the discrepancies under Requirement 3(c).\n\n    e. Carry out Requirement 3(a) if any functional test carried out under Requirement 3 (d) was unsuccessful.\n\nNote: FAA AD 94-16-03 Amdt 39-8993 refers and supersedes FAA AD 92-03-03.\n\nBoeing 767 Series Aeroplanes\n\nAD/B767/89 Amdt 1 (continued)\n\nCompliance: For Requirement 1: Unless previously accomplished, within 4000 hours time in service since installation of the thrust reverser synch-lock required by AD/B767/63 amdt 3, or within 4000 hours time in service from the last functional test of the synch- lock system, whichever occurs later.\n\nFor Requirement 2: At intervals not exceeding 4000 hours time in service. For Requirement 3 (a) or (b): Prior to further flight.\n\nFor Requirement 3 (c): Within 10 days after thrust reverser deactivation. For Requirement 3 (d) and (e): Prior to further flight.\n\nThis Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 31 October 2002.\n\nBackground: This amendment to the Directive includes numerous editorial changes that include changes to the structure of the requirements and compliance sections. These changes have no affect on the original technical requirements of this Directive. However, it should be noted that the MEL relief provisions have been modified to better amplify the requirements in this regard.\n\nThe repetitive function tests of the thrust reverser additional locking system required by this Directive was previously addressed by Requirement 3 of AD/B767/63 Amdt\n\n2. This action separates the requirements for the thrust reverser in order to provide ease of maintenance control.\n\nThe actions specified in this amendment, and the original Directive, are intended to prevent possible discrepancies in the thrust reverser system that can result in an inadvertent in- flight deployment.\n\n![Signature of James Coyne, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.](image.002.png)  \n\nJames Coyne\n\nDelegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 30 August 2002\n\n![](image.001.png)  \n\nThe above AD is notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 9 October 2002.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The Background section explicitly states this amendment involves 'numerous editorial changes' and restructuring 'with no affect on the original technical requirements.' The amendment separates thrust reverser requirements from AD/B767/63 for 'ease of maintenance control' but does not expand the substantive safety scope beyond the original intent of preventing inadvertent in-flight thrust reverser deployment."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple cross-references to other directives (AD/B767/63, FAA AD 94-16-03, FAA AD 92-03-03)","Nested conditional logic in Requirement 3 (if/then/else structure with multiple sub-requirements 3a through 3e)","Dual applicability criteria (two different engine types with different service bulletins)","Complex compliance timeline with multiple triggers ('whichever occurs later' calculations)","Integration with external documents (Minimum Equipment List, approved maintenance data, FAA ADs)","Technical aviation terminology requiring specialized knowledge (synch-lock, thrust reverser, time in service, MEL)"],"plain_english_summary":"This AD requires operators of Boeing 767s with specified Pratt & Whitney or General Electric engines to perform regular functional tests of the thrust reverser synch‑lock system (every 4,000 flight hours) and to repair any faults immediately or operate under strict limitations until fixed. It affects airlines, maintenance engineers, and aircraft operators responsible for airworthiness.\n\nIt’s an amendment that reorganises the original 1989 directive for clarity without changing the safety requirements aimed at preventing in‑flight thrust reverser deployment."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"Amendment is largely editorial and does not change the original technical requirements. It reorganises requirements, clarifies MEL relief provisions and separates thrust‑reverser requirements for ease of maintenance control (Background)."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple conditional pathways for handling discrepancies (Requirement 3(a) corrective action vs 3(b) MEL operation) increases decision points for operators.","Mandatory repeat testing schedule (Requirement 2) and re‑test obligations after corrective action (Requirements 3(d) and 3(e)).","Timing constraints tied to service hours since installation or last test (Compliance: within 4000 hours) creating tracking and record‑keeping burdens.","Applicability limited by engine type and incorporation of specific Boeing Service Bulletins, requiring fleet‑by‑fleet applicability checks.","Dependency on approved maintenance data and MEL approvals introduces administrative and procedural reliance on external documents and authority.","Cross‑reference to FAA AD 94‑16‑03 and previous ADs requires alignment with external regulatory material."],"plain_english_summary":"Requires operators of Boeing 767 aeroplanes with specified Pratt & Whitney JTD9D‑7R4 or GE CF6‑80A engines (and the listed Boeing service bulletin revisions) to perform recurring functional tests of the thrust‑reverser synch‑lock and to correct any faults before further flight or operate under narrowly defined MEL conditions with re‑tests. The measure is intended to detect and fix faults that could lead to inadvertent in‑flight deployment of a thrust reverser and clarifies MEL relief and maintenance control arrangements."},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"Unauthenticated. Configure AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY or use a provider module. Learn more: https://ai-sdk.dev/unauthenticated-ai-gateway","source":"analysis-cron"}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-b767-89-amdt-1-thrust-reverser-control-system-operational-checks","history":"/api/acts/ad-b767-89-amdt-1-thrust-reverser-control-system-operational-checks/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-b767-89-amdt-1-thrust-reverser-control-system-operational-checks/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-b767-89-amdt-1-thrust-reverser-control-system-operational-checks/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-b767-89-amdt-1-thrust-reverser-control-system-operational-checks/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-b767-89-amdt-1-thrust-reverser-control-system-operational-checks/documents"}}