{"id":"F2006B03436","name":"AD/B767/82 Amdt 1 - Ram Air Turbine Pressure Transfer Tube","slug":"ad-b767-82-amdt-1-ram-air-turbine-pressure-transfer-tube","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":42990,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B03436-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"AD/B767/82 Amdt 1 - Ram Air Turbine Pressure Transfer Tube","content":"COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nBoeing 767 Series Aeroplanes\n\nAD/B767/82\n\nAmdt 1\n\n  \nRam Air Turbine Pressure Transfer Tube 13/95\n\nApplicability: Boeing 767 series aircraft with line number 1 through 564 inclusive.\n\nRequirement: Unless previously carried out, action in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-29A0077 Revision 1.\n\nNote: FAA AD 95-18-02 Amdt 39-9350 and Sundstrand Corporation SB 729548-29- 14 Revision 1 refers.\n\nCompliance: As specified in Boeing SB 767-29A0077 Revision 1.\n\nBackground: One 767 operator has reported two incidents where the ram air turbine (RAT) hydraulic pressure transfer tube cracked when the RAT was extended during flight test. Cracks in the RAT pressure hydraulic transfer tube could cause the loss of all the centre system hydraulic fluid resulting in loss of centre system hydraulic power to the primary flight controls. Amendment 1 being raised to mandate compliance with Revision 1 to Boeing ASB 767-29A0077.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This is a standard amendment to an existing Airworthiness Directive. Amendment 1 simply updates the mandated compliance document from the original Boeing Alert Service Bulletin to Revision 1 of that same bulletin. The scope remains tightly focused on the specific RAT pressure transfer tube defect in the specified aircraft range, with no expansion beyond the original safety purpose."},"complexity_factors":["Very short document (approximately 150 words)","Only 1 defined term implicitly referenced (line number)","No cross-references to other legislation or regulations beyond a single note referencing related FAA and manufacturer documents","Single, clear compliance requirement with no conditional logic or exceptions","Straightforward applicability criteria (line numbers 1-564)","No nested provisions or subsections"],"plain_english_summary":"This is a **safety order for specific Boeing 767 aircraft**.\n\n**What it does:**\nThis document is an **Airworthiness Directive (AD)** — a mandatory safety instruction issued by Australia's Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA). It requires owners and operators of certain Boeing 767 aeroplanes to inspect and fix a potentially dangerous defect in the **ram air turbine (RAT) pressure transfer tube**.\n\n**The problem:**\nThe RAT is a small emergency turbine that drops down from the aircraft to generate hydraulic power if the engines fail. The **pressure transfer tube** is a pipe that carries hydraulic fluid from this turbine. Cracks have been found in this tube during flight tests. If the tube cracks in flight, it could drain all hydraulic fluid from the centre system — meaning the pilots would lose hydraulic power to the primary flight controls, making the aircraft extremely difficult to fly.\n\n**Who must act:**\n- **Aircraft affected:** Boeing 767 series planes with \"line numbers\" (manufacturing serial numbers) 1 through 564 — essentially the earlier production aircraft.\n- **People responsible:** Airlines, aircraft owners, and maintenance organisations operating these specific aircraft in Australia.\n\n**What must be done:**\nOperators must follow the instructions in **Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-29A0077 Revision 1** — a technical document from the manufacturer detailing the inspection and repair procedure. This amendment (Amendment 1) updates the original directive to require compliance with the revised version of Boeing's service bulletin.\n\n**Why it matters:**\nThis is a **critical safety issue**. Loss of hydraulic power to primary flight controls is a serious emergency. The directive ensures potentially defective parts are identified and fixed before they cause an accident."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"Amendment 1 updates the AD to mandate compliance with Revision 1 of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-29A0077. The Background states that Amendment 1 is being raised specifically to require compliance with Revision 1, so the AD's operative requirement has been changed from the prior version to incorporate the revised Boeing ASB. (Background; Requirement)"},"complexity_factors":["References and delegates technical requirements to an external manufacturer document (Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-29A0077 Revision 1) rather than setting technical steps in the AD itself (Requirement; Compliance).","Safety-critical subject matter (hydraulic transfer tube failure affecting centre system hydraulic power) increases operational and regulatory scrutiny (Background).","Applicability limited to a specific line-number range (1–564), which narrows scope but requires accurate fleet records (Applicability).","Cross-references to other regulatory and supplier documents (FAA AD 95-18-02; Sundstrand SB) add layers that operators may need to consult (Note).","Mandatory nature under Civil Aviation Regulations Part 39 reduces discretion but increases compliance enforcement obligations (Commonwealth of Australia (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39; Requirement)."],"plain_english_summary":"This AD mandates operators of Boeing 767 aeroplanes (line numbers 1–564) to carry out the corrective actions in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767‑29A0077 Revision 1. It was issued after reports of RAT hydraulic pressure transfer‑tube cracking, which could cause loss of centre hydraulic fluid and primary flight‑control power. Operators must comply and bear the maintenance costs."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-b767-82-amdt-1-ram-air-turbine-pressure-transfer-tube","history":"/api/acts/ad-b767-82-amdt-1-ram-air-turbine-pressure-transfer-tube/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-b767-82-amdt-1-ram-air-turbine-pressure-transfer-tube/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-b767-82-amdt-1-ram-air-turbine-pressure-transfer-tube/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-b767-82-amdt-1-ram-air-turbine-pressure-transfer-tube/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-b767-82-amdt-1-ram-air-turbine-pressure-transfer-tube/documents"}}