{"id":"F2006B03434","name":"AD/B767/8 Amdt 3 - Intermediate Pressure Check Valves","slug":"ad-b767-8-amdt-3-intermediate-pressure-check-valves","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":42986,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B03434-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"AD/B767/8 Amdt 3 - Intermediate Pressure Check Valves","content":"COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\n![](image.001.png)  \n![](image.002.png)  \nBoeing 767 Series Aeroplanes\n\nAIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE\n\n![](image.002.png)\n\n![](image.002.png)  \nFor the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below revokes Airworthiness Directive (AD) AD/B767/8 Amdt 2 and issues the following AD under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.\n\nAD/B767/8\n\nAmdt 3\n\n  \nIntermediate Pressure Check Valves 3/2000\n\nApplicability: Boeing 767 series aircraft equipped with Hamilton Standard 8th stage bleed pneumatic system check valves, Part Nos. 773856-3 through -15.\n\nRequirement: Inspect affected 8th stage bleed check valves in accordance with Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin 36-2078, 36-2078 Revision 1 or 36-2078 Revision 2.\n\nCompliance with Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin 36-2116, either original issue or Revision 1, constitutes terminating action for this airworthiness directive.\n\nNote: FAA AD 90-12-02 refers. AD 90-12-02 supersedes AD 90-04-10.\n\nCompliance: Unless previously accomplished, within 500 flight hours after the effective date of this airworthiness directive, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1200 flight hours.\n\nThis Amendment becomes effective on 23 March 2000.\n\nBackground: The FAA has received reports of fragments of failed valves becoming lodged in other pneumatic system components, engine damage caused by fragment ingestion and cracked valve removals.\n\nThis amendment updates the AD and provides terminating action for the required inspection.\n\nCOMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\nAmendment 2 was raised in response to reports of cracks being found in previously modified check valves at considerably less hours time in service than the current inspection interval.\n\nAmendment 2 of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 17 May 1990.\n\nAmendment 1 of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 30 September 1987.\n\nThe original issue of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 16 April 1986.\n\n![Signature of Eugene Paul Holzapfel, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.](image.003.png)  \n\nEugene Paul Holzapfel\n\nDelegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority\n\n12 February 2000\n\n![](image.002.png)  \n\nThe above AD is notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 23 February 2000.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"A positive credit balance is required for all requests, including BYOK, so fallback providers remain available. Add credits at https://vercel.com/d?to=%2F%5Bteam%5D%2F%7E%2Fai%3Fmodal%3Dtop-up to continue.","source":"analysis-cron"},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This amendment maintains the original scope of addressing unsafe check valves in Boeing 767 aircraft. While it updates the technical requirements (adding terminating action and revising inspection intervals), it does not expand beyond the original purpose of ensuring valve safety in the specified aircraft type."},"complexity_factors":["Very short document (approximately 400 words)","Only 1 defined term implicitly used ('flight hours')","No cross-references to other legislation beyond naming related FAA directives","Simple conditional structure: inspect by X date, then every Y hours, unless already done","Single technical reference to manufacturer service bulletins","Clear, linear compliance requirements with no nested exceptions"],"plain_english_summary":"This CASA Airworthiness Directive mandates inspections of Hamilton Standard 8th-stage bleed pneumatic check valves (P/Ns 773856-3 through -15) on affected Boeing 767 aircraft, requiring an initial check within 500 flight hours and recurring checks every 1,200 hours unless operators adopt SB 36-2116 as a terminating action. \n\nIt responds to FAA reports that valve rupture can eject debris into bleed lines or engines, risking system or engine damage; this is the third amendment, replacing the prior version."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This Amendment 3 does not materially broaden the original subject matter. It continues to address the same unsafe condition (failure/fracture of Hamilton Standard 8th stage bleed check valves on Boeing 767s) and the same population of parts (Part Nos. 773856-3 through -15). The change in this amendment is procedural/technical: it updates inspection instructions and adds an identified terminating action (Service Bulletin 36-2116) that ends the recurring inspection requirement. It therefore refines compliance options rather than expanding the AD's substantive scope beyond its original safety purpose."},"complexity_factors":["Short document (single AD amendment with limited sections).","Few technical references: two Hamilton Standard service bulletins (36-2078 series and 36-2116 series).","Simple numeric timing conditions: initial compliance within 500 flight hours; repeat interval 1,200 flight hours.","One terminating-action clause that removes recurring inspections if implemented.","Cross-reference to a single FAA AD (90-12-02) and prior amendments, but no dense statutory cross-references or multiple conditional branches."],"plain_english_summary":"**What this instrument does (mechanically):**\n\n- This is an Airworthiness Directive (AD) that requires operators of certain Boeing 767 aeroplanes to inspect and, if necessary, remediate a specific type of pneumatic check valve (the 8th stage bleed check valves, Hamilton Standard Part Nos. 773856-3 through -15).  The inspection must be carried out in accordance with Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin 36-2078 (original issue, Revision 1 or Revision 2).\n- If an operator carries out the action described in Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin 36-2116 (original issue or Revision 1), that work counts as the terminating action for this AD (i.e. it ends the recurring inspection requirement).\n- Timing: the first inspection must be done within 500 flight hours after the AD’s effective date, and thereafter inspections must be repeated at intervals not to exceed 1,200 flight hours unless the terminating action has been completed.\n- The AD revokes the previous Amendment 2 and replaces it with this Amendment 3.  The background cites FAA reports of fragments from failed valves lodging in pneumatic components and causing engine damage.\n\n**Who this affects:**\n\n- Airline operators that operate Boeing 767 series aeroplanes fitted with Hamilton Standard 8th stage bleed check valves, Part Nos. 773856-3 to -15.\n- Maintenance organisations and mechanics who perform scheduled inspections and corrective work on those valves.\n- Parts suppliers and the valve manufacturer (Hamilton Standard) because the directive refers to their service bulletins and potential terminating modifications.\n\n**Why it matters (safety and operational mechanics):**\n\n- Safety rationale: fragments from failed valves have been reported to lodge in other pneumatic components and to have been ingested by engines. The inspections and the terminating modification are intended to find cracked or failing valves before they cause secondary damage.\n- Operational mechanics: operators must plan for an inspection within a short window (500 flight hours) and recurring inspections every 1,200 flight hours until they carry out the terminating fix. That creates recurring maintenance tasks, potential downtime for aircraft, and record-keeping obligations to demonstrate compliance.\n\n**Who pays and who decides:**\n\n- Operators (airlines) pay for the inspections, any repairs or replacements, and aircraft downtime. Maintenance organisations perform the work and charge for labour and parts.\n- The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), through its delegate, issues and enforces the AD under the Civil Aviation Regulations 1998; the AD requires compliance with manufacturer service bulletins as the technical instructions.\n\n**Incentives, costs and trade-offs:**\n\n- Concentrated benefits accrue to maintenance shops and the manufacturer (they provide the service and parts). The cost is concentrated on aircraft operators who must schedule and fund inspections and any replacements.\n- Operators can choose between repeated inspections (ongoing recurring cost and scheduling burden) or implementing the terminating action (presumably a one-time cost and removal of recurring inspections). That creates a substitution choice: recurring inspection versus one-time modification.\n- Potential implementation risks include availability of parts or qualified maintenance slots for the terminating modification, and transient fleet disruption while inspections/modifications are completed.\n\n**Cross‑references and enforcement mechanics:**\n\n- The AD explicitly requires compliance with Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin 36-2078 (or Revisions 1 or 2) and identifies Service Bulletin 36-2116 (original or Revision 1) as terminating.\n- The AD notes related FAA AD 90-12-02 (which superseded FAA AD 90-04-10), indicating the FAA addressed the same unsafe condition and that this AD is aligned with that earlier FAA action.\n\n**Concrete behavioural effects:**\n\n- Operators must inspect affected valves within 500 flight hours and then at intervals not exceeding 1,200 flight hours until they implement the terminating modification.\n- Maintenance providers will perform inspections and corrective work following the referenced service bulletins.\n- Operators that implement the terminating action will remove the need for recurring inspections under this AD.\n\n(Requirement and Compliance text cited: “Requirement: Inspect affected 8th stage bleed check valves in accordance with Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin 36-2078, 36-2078 Revision 1 or 36-2078 Revision 2.”; “Compliance: … within 500 flight hours after the effective date … and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1200 flight hours.”; “Compliance with Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin 36-2116 … constitutes terminating action for this airworthiness directive.”)\n"}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-b767-8-amdt-3-intermediate-pressure-check-valves","history":"/api/acts/ad-b767-8-amdt-3-intermediate-pressure-check-valves/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-b767-8-amdt-3-intermediate-pressure-check-valves/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-b767-8-amdt-3-intermediate-pressure-check-valves/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-b767-8-amdt-3-intermediate-pressure-check-valves/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-b767-8-amdt-3-intermediate-pressure-check-valves/documents"}}