{"id":"F2006B03415","name":"AD/B767/61 Amdt 2 - Thrust Reverser Control System","slug":"ad-b767-61-amdt-2-thrust-reverser-control-system","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":42956,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B03415-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"AD/B767/61 Amdt 2 - Thrust Reverser Control System","content":"COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nBoeing 767 Series Aeroplanes\n\nAD/B767/61\n\nAmdt 2\n\n  \nThrust Reverser Control System 6/96\n\nApplicability: All Boeing 767 series aircraft equipped with General Electric CF6-80C2 series engines not incorporating Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0063.\n\nRequirement: 1. Inspect and test the thrust reverser system in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0047 Rev 2 or Rev 3.\n\nIf any of the inspections or tests specified in the Requirement of this Directive cannot be successfully performed or fail the acceptance criteria, either rectify the defect or de-activate the defective thrust reverser per the appropriate B767 maintenance procedures before further flight. Only one thrust reverser per aircraft may be de-activated at any one time.\n\nAny thrust reverser that has been de-activated as a result of the requirements of this Directive is to be rectified; the inspections/tests specified in the applicable service bulletin successfully performed; and the thrust reverser re-activated within 10 days.\n\n2. Install an additional locking device on the thrust reversers in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0063 Rev 2 or Rev 3.\n\nIncorporation of Boeing SB 767-78-0063 Rev 2 or Rev 3 provides terminating action for the inspections and tests mandated by Requirement 1 of this Directive.\n\nNote. FAA AD 95-13-12 R1 refers and supersedes FAA AD 91-22-02.\n\nCompliance: 1. Unless previously accomplished, prior to 15 August 1996 and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 flight hours since last inspection. Upon completion of the initial inspection special provisions apply to Para 111H of SB B767-78-0047 Rev 3 (see below).\n\nCompliance with Para 111H of SB 767-78-0047 Rev 3: At intervals not to exceed 1,500 flight hours, or whenever maintenance action is taken that would disturb the DPV grounding circuit.\n\nNote. Para 111H refers to testing the integrity of the safety grounding wire for the thrust reverser directional pilot valve (DPV) “Hot Short” protection.\n\n2. No later than 31 December 1998.\n\nBackground: The FAA have advised of a Boeing 767 accident in which a thrust reverser apparently deployed in flight. This can result in reduced controllability of the aircraft.\n\nThis AD has been issued in order to detect and prevent possible discrepancies in the thrust reverser system that can result in inadvertent deployment of the thrust reverser during flight.\n\nCOMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\nThis amendment mandates an additional locking device for the thrust reverser which also provides terminating action for the inspections/tests mandated by previous issues of this Directive.\n\nThe original issue of this AD became effective on 30 December 1991\\. Amendment 1 of this AD became effective on 11 November 1993.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"This is Amendment 2 to an existing Airworthiness Directive. The original 1991 directive only required inspections and tests. Amendment 1 (1993) likely refined these requirements. Amendment 2 (1996) significantly expanded the scope by adding Requirement 2—the mandatory installation of an additional locking device—which provides 'terminating action' (a permanent fix) for the ongoing inspection regime. The directive evolved from a recurring inspection requirement to a two-stage process culminating in a mandatory hardware modification."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple compliance deadlines with conditional logic (initial inspection by 15 August 1996, then recurring intervals of 3,000 flight hours, with a separate 1,500-hour interval for specific electrical tests)","Cross-references to external Boeing Service Bulletins (767-78-0047 Rev 2/3 and 767-78-0063 Rev 2/3) without reproducing their content","Conditional termination clause (Requirement 2 terminates Requirement 1, but only upon completion)","Operational restrictions during non-compliance (only one thrust reverser may be de-activated at any time, 10-day limit on de-activation)","Nested applicability criteria (all 767 series → equipped with CF6-80C2 engines → not incorporating specific service bulletin)","Reference to foreign regulatory instrument (FAA AD 95-13-12 R1) in explanatory note"],"plain_english_summary":"This safety order requires operators of Boeing 767s with General Electric CF6-80C2 engines (unless already modified per Boeing SB 767-78-0063) to inspect, test, and correct the thrust reverser control system to prevent accidental in‑flight deployment. Defective units must be repaired or a single reverser may be deactivated (repaired and reactivated within 10 days). Operators must install an additional locking device by 31 Dec 1998, after which repetitive inspections are no longer required. It responds to a reported in‑flight deployment risk."},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"Unauthenticated. Configure AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY or use a provider module. Learn more: https://ai-sdk.dev/unauthenticated-ai-gateway","source":"analysis-cron"},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":6,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"This amendment expands the AD's scope by adding a mandated structural modification (installation of an additional locking device) that, once installed, terminates the prior recurring inspection/testing obligations. It also specifies concrete compliance deadlines and permits temporary de‑activation of a single reverser with a 10‑day repair window. Mechanically, the regime shifts from ongoing inspections alone to a choice between continuing inspections or completing a one‑off modification; operators bear the costs and scheduling consequences."},"complexity_factors":["Dependence on external manufacturer Service Bulletins (SB 767‑78‑0047 Rev 2/3 and SB 767‑78‑0063 Rev 2/3) to define required inspections, tests and modification details increases technical and compliance complexity.","Multiple compliance deadlines and recurring intervals (initial inspection by 15 Aug 1996, recurring every 3,000 fh, DPV grounding test at 1,500 fh in some cases, and modification by 31 Dec 1998) create scheduling and record‑keeping burdens.","Technical nature of required testing (including Para 111H DPV safety‑grounding \"Hot Short\" protection testing) requires specialised maintenance procedures and diagnostic capability.","Operational allowance to de‑activate a single thrust reverser as a temporary mitigation, with a strict 10‑day rectification requirement, introduces short‑term operational constraints and risk management choices for operators.","Provision that installing SB 767‑78‑0063 is terminating action for recurring inspections alters long‑term compliance paths and cost timing (inspection burden versus one‑off modification cost).","Cross‑referencing and alignment with FAA ADs adds regulatory interaction complexity for operators conducting international operations and maintenance.","Applicability carve‑outs (applies only to CF6‑80C2‑equipped aircraft not already incorporating the SB) require fleet‑level tracking of configuration status."],"plain_english_summary":"This airworthiness directive makes operators of Boeing 767s with GE CF6‑80C2 engines (unless Boeing Service Bulletin 767‑78‑0063 is already fitted) carry out regular inspections and tests of the thrust‑reverser control system, allows temporary de‑activation of one reverser until repaired (must be fixed and re‑activated within 10 days), and requires installation of an additional locking device by 31 December 1998. It is intended to detect and prevent inadvertent in‑flight reverser deployment; airlines bear the inspection, repair and modification costs and must schedule checks at specified flight‑hour intervals."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-b767-61-amdt-2-thrust-reverser-control-system","history":"/api/acts/ad-b767-61-amdt-2-thrust-reverser-control-system/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-b767-61-amdt-2-thrust-reverser-control-system/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-b767-61-amdt-2-thrust-reverser-control-system/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-b767-61-amdt-2-thrust-reverser-control-system/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-b767-61-amdt-2-thrust-reverser-control-system/documents"}}