{"id":"F2006B03411","name":"AD/B767/57 - Cargo Fire Extinguishing Agent Containers","slug":"ad-b767-57-cargo-fire-extinguishing-agent-containers","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":42952,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B03411-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"AD/B767/57 - Cargo Fire Extinguishing Agent Containers","content":"COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nBoeing 767 Series Aeroplanes\n\nAD/B767/57 Cargo Fire Extinguishing Agent Containers 9/91\n\nApplicability: Model 767 series as listed in Boeing SB 767-26A 0075, and SB 767-26 0076. Requirement: Action IAW the Technical Requirements of FAA AD 91-12-03 Amdt 39-7014. Compliance: As specified in the Requirement Document with a revised effective date of\n\n5 September 1991 for Australian registered aircraft.\n\nBackground: The FAA has received a report from one operator identifying two occurrences of false indication of low pressure in the cargo compartment fire extinguishing containers.\n\nThis condition, if not corrected, could reduce or stop the discharge of fire extinguishing agent due to water freezing in the metered distribution lines, and could cause false low pressure indications in the initial discharge indicating system.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This is a standard airworthiness directive with a narrow, specific safety purpose. It addresses a particular mechanical defect in a specific aircraft type and does not expand beyond its original safety intent."},"complexity_factors":["Very short document (under 200 words)","Only 2 defined applicability references (the Boeing service bulletins)","Single requirement: comply with an external FAA directive","No nested conditions, exceptions, or cross-references to other Australian legislation","Straightforward compliance deadline with no alternative methods or conditional timelines"],"plain_english_summary":"This is an **Airworthiness Directive** (a mandatory safety order) issued by Australia's Civil Aviation Safety Authority for **Boeing 767 aircraft**.\n\n**What it does:**\n- Requires airlines and aircraft operators to inspect and fix a specific problem with **cargo fire extinguishing systems**\n- The problem involves **faulty pressure indicators** that can give false \"low pressure\" warnings\n\n**Why it matters:**\n- If not fixed, water can freeze in the fire suppression system's pipes, blocking the flow of fire-extinguishing chemicals\n- This means if a fire breaks out in the cargo hold, the system might fail to put it out — a serious safety risk\n- The false warnings also mean pilots might think the system is broken when it's actually working, or vice versa\n\n**Who must comply:**\n- Owners and operators of Australian-registered Boeing 767 series aircraft covered by two specific Boeing service bulletins (SB 767-26A 0075 and SB 767-26 0076)\n\n**What they must do:**\n- Follow the technical instructions in **FAA AD 91-12-03** (an American safety order that Australia is adopting)\n- Complete the work by **5 September 1991**"},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":6,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This AD adopts, for Australian-registered aircraft, the technical requirements of FAA AD 91-12-03 (Amdt 39-7014) for the Boeing 767 models listed in Boeing SB 767-26A 0075 and SB 767-26 0076 (Requirement; Applicability). It does not expand the set of affected components or models beyond those specified in the referenced FAA AD and Boeing service bulletins; it aligns Australian compliance and timing (revised effective date 5 September 1991) with those external requirements (Compliance)."},"complexity_factors":["Mandatory adoption by reference of external technical documents (FAA AD 91-12-03 and Boeing SB 767-26A 0075 / SB 767-26 0076) increases administrative complexity and requires cross-referencing.","Technical subject matter (cargo fire-extinguishing systems, metered distribution lines, freeze risk) requires specialist maintenance skills and parts.","Applicability limited to specific Boeing 767 models listed in service bulletins; operators must determine whether their airframes are in scope (Applicability).","Compliance timing set by a revised effective date adds an administrative scheduling requirement (Compliance).","Enforcement and verification depend on CASA oversight and operators' maintenance records, creating record-keeping and audit complexity.","Potential logistical constraints (parts availability, qualified technicians, maintenance slots) affect implementation risk and sequencing."],"plain_english_summary":"What this instrument does (mechanics):\n\n- It requires operators of certain Boeing 767 aeroplanes registered in Australia to carry out the technical actions set out in the referenced FAA airworthiness directive (FAA AD 91-12-03 Amdt 39-7014). The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) makes those FAA technical requirements mandatory for the Australian-registered aircraft listed in Boeing Service Bulletins SB 767-26A 0075 and SB 767-26 0076 (Applicability; Requirement). The compliance timing for Australian-registered aircraft is set with an effective date of 5 September 1991 (Compliance).\n\nWhy the change was made (official rationale):\n\n- The FAA received a report from an operator of two occurrences where cargo fire extinguishing containers showed false low-pressure indications. The reported fault could let water freeze in metered distribution lines, which might reduce or stop discharge of fire-extinguishing agent and could cause false low-pressure indications on initial discharge (Background).\n\nWho it affects and who decides:\n\n- Who pays: The direct cost and operational burden fall on operators of the specific Boeing 767 models listed in the Boeing service bulletins (Applicability). Those operators must carry out the inspections, repairs or modifications specified in the FAA AD and related Boeing service bulletins (Requirement). Costs include labour, parts, any needed maintenance-line downtime, and administrative record-keeping.\n\n- Who decides: CASA issues this Airworthiness Directive and makes compliance mandatory for Australian-registered aircraft. The technical content and steps to be performed are those in the named FAA AD and Boeing service bulletins, which CASA has adopted by reference (Requirement).\n\nWhat behaviour changes: Operators must inspect and, if necessary, modify or repair the cargo compartment fire-extinguishing system in line with the FAA AD/Boeing service bulletins. That will change maintenance schedules and may require targeted parts and qualified personnel to complete the work. The stated operational objective is to eliminate false low-pressure indications and prevent loss or reduction of fire-extinguishing discharge caused by freezing in distribution lines (Background).\n\nTrade-offs, incentives and implementation risks (light analytic lens):\n\n- Cross-reference dependence: The instrument adopts external technical documents (FAA AD 91-12-03 and Boeing SB 767-26A 0075 / SB 767-26 0076). Operators must obtain and follow those documents; CASA does not reproduce the technical steps in this notice (Requirement). That creates an administrative and operational dependency on externally published procedures and on keeping those documents accessible and current.\n\n- Compliance burden and costs: The immediate burden is on aircraft operators to fund labour, parts and potential aircraft downtime required to perform inspections and corrective action (Applicability; Requirement). Smaller operators with fewer maintenance resources may face relatively higher per-aircraft costs or scheduling difficulty.\n\n- Implementation risk: The remedy targets a condition caused by water freezing in metered distribution lines (Background). Effective mitigation depends on accurate diagnosis, correct remedy, and availability of parts/qualified technicians. If any of those are constrained, the risk persists until remedied.\n\n- Concentrated vs diffuse effects: The safety benefit is concentrated on users of the affected aircraft (operators, crews and passengers on those planes) while costs are concentrated on the operators. There is no explicit mechanism here that redistributes costs or provides compensation; CASA’s directive simply adopts the FAA/Boeing technical solution (Applicability; Requirement).\n\n- Operational substitution: Operators may need to re-prioritise maintenance windows, which can alter flight schedules or maintenance plans. The directive does not specify operational mitigations (e.g., temporary restrictions) beyond compliance with the FAA AD.\n\nSummary sentence: CASA requires specified Boeing 767 models registered in Australia to be inspected and remediated according to FAA AD 91-12-03 and the cited Boeing service bulletins, to address reported false low-pressure indications and the risk that frozen water in distribution lines could reduce or prevent cargo fire-extinguishing agent discharge (Applicability; Requirement; Background; Compliance)."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-b767-57-cargo-fire-extinguishing-agent-containers","history":"/api/acts/ad-b767-57-cargo-fire-extinguishing-agent-containers/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-b767-57-cargo-fire-extinguishing-agent-containers/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-b767-57-cargo-fire-extinguishing-agent-containers/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-b767-57-cargo-fire-extinguishing-agent-containers/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-b767-57-cargo-fire-extinguishing-agent-containers/documents"}}