{"id":"F2006B03407","name":"AD/B767/53 - Cargo Fire Protection","slug":"ad-b767-53-cargo-fire-protection","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":42948,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B03407-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"AD/B767/53 - Cargo Fire Protection","content":"---\nmeta-content-style-type: text/css\nmeta-content-type: application/xhtml+xml; charset=utf-8\nmeta-generator: Aspose.Words for .NET 22.10.0\n---\n\n?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\" standalone=\"no\"?>\n\nCOMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\n \n\n![](image.001.png)  Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes\n\n \n\nAD/B767/53 Cargo Fire Protection 3/91\n\nApplicability: Model 767 series listed in Boeing Alert SB 767-26A0068 Rev. 1.\n\n \n\nRequirement: Action in accordance with the technical requirements of FAA AD 90-26-02 Amdt 39- 6829 Part B and Part C.\n\n \n\nNote: Boeing SB 767-26A0068 Rev. 1 refers.\n\n \n\nCompliance: As specified in the Requirement Document with revised effective date of 21 March 1991.\n\n \n\nBackground: In response to a report from the manufacturer that fire protection components may have been incorrectly installed during production, this AD requires an inspection of the cargo compartments fire extinguisher orifices for correct part fitment.\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The directive maintains its original substantive scope: inspection of cargo compartment extinguisher orifices on the Model 767 series identified in Boeing SB 767-26A0068 Rev. 1 and compliance with FAA AD 90-26-02 Part B and Part C. The instrument does note a revised effective date of 21 March 1991 for compliance (Compliance), but it does not alter the described applicability or the nature of the required inspections (Applicability; Requirement; Background)."},"complexity_factors":["Cross-reference to external technical documents (FAA AD 90-26-02 and Boeing SB 767-26A0068 Rev. 1) — requires operators to obtain and follow outside material (Requirement; Note).","Technical nature of the task — inspection and possible corrective work on fire extinguisher orifices requires qualified maintenance personnel and parts identification (Background; Requirement).","Fleet applicability — applies to Model 767 series listed in the Boeing service bulletin, so operators must determine which airframes in their fleet are captured (Applicability).","Compliance scheduling — the AD defers to the compliance times specified in the requirement documents and notes a revised effective date, creating a need to track timing accurately (Compliance).","Potential operational disruption — inspections and any rectification may cause aircraft downtime and associated commercial costs, which operators must manage (Requirement; Compliance)."],"plain_english_summary":"### What this instrument does\n\nThis Airworthiness Directive (AD) requires specific inspections of the cargo compartment fire extinguisher orifices on certain Boeing 767 aeroplanes. The AD applies to the Model 767 series identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-26A0068 Rev. 1 (\"Applicability\"). The mechanical effect is: operators must carry out the inspection and any corrective work in accordance with the technical requirements set out in FAA AD 90-26-02 Amdt 39-6829 Part B and Part C (\"Requirement\") and the Boeing service bulletin referenced (\"Note\"). The compliance schedule is as specified in those requirement documents, with a revised effective date of 21 March 1991 (\"Compliance\").\n\n### Who is affected\n\n- Aircraft owners/operators of the Model 767 series listed in Boeing Alert SB 767-26A0068 Rev. 1 (Applicability).\n- Maintenance organisations or personnel who perform the inspections and any corrective actions called for by the FAA AD and Boeing service bulletin (Requirement; Note).\n\n### Why it matters (stated purpose and operational mechanics)\n\n- Stated purpose: the manufacturer reported that fire protection components may have been incorrectly installed during production; the AD therefore requires inspection of the cargo compartment fire extinguisher orifices for correct part fitment (Background).\n\n- Mechanical effect of that purpose: the AD directs operators to inspect a specific component, and to follow the FAA and Boeing technical procedures for inspection and any remedial work (Requirement; Note).\n\n### Who pays and who decides\n\n- Who pays: the operator of the affected aeroplane pays for the inspection, any corrective work, and any associated aircraft downtime. This follows from the Requirement and Compliance obligations placed on operators (Requirement; Compliance).\n\n- Who decides / enforces: the Civil Aviation Safety Authority issues and enforces the AD under the Commonwealth schedule of Airworthiness Directives; the AD requires compliance with FAA AD text and Boeing service bulletin procedures (COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY; Requirement; Note).\n\n### Compliance burden, incentives and practical trade-offs\n\n- Compliance burden: operators must obtain and follow the FAA AD and Boeing SB 767-26A0068 Rev. 1 to complete inspections and any corrective actions (Requirement; Note). This creates direct labour, parts and potential downtime costs for operators (Requirement; Compliance).\n\n- Technical skill and information dependency: the AD cross‑references technical documents produced outside the AD itself (FAA AD and Boeing SB). Operators and maintenance providers must secure and correctly interpret those external documents before acting (Requirement; Note). That raises implementation risk if the correct revision of the service bulletin or the FAA AD text is not used.\n\n- Incentives and behaviour change: because compliance is mandatory for affected models (Applicability; Requirement), operators are incentivised to locate affected aircraft, schedule inspections, and, if necessary, replace or refit parts to meet the specified fitment requirements (Background; Requirement). Operators may also prioritise aircraft that have not yet been inspected or that are scheduled for maintenance.\n\n- Trade-offs and opportunity costs: time and resources spent on these inspections are not available for other maintenance or commercial activity. The AD does not itself specify funding or compensation mechanisms, so operators bear opportunity costs of labour, parts and aircraft out-of-service time (Requirement; Compliance).\n\n### Implementation risks and discrete compliance issues\n\n- Identification and rectification risk: the AD responds to possible incorrect installation in production (Background). Correctly identifying the affected orifice parts and performing the right corrective action depends on following the FAA AD and Boeing SB procedures (Requirement; Note).\n\n- Cross-jurisdictional reliance: the AD requires conformity with the FAA AD text and a Boeing service bulletin (Requirement; Note). That means the Australian requirement is operationally implemented by following foreign-regulator text and manufacturer instructions, which can create administrative steps (obtaining documents, ensuring correct revisions) for Australian operators.\n\n### What the AD does not itself do (as stated)\n\n- The AD does not specify exact inspection steps or timelines within this text; those details are contained in the external FAA AD and Boeing service bulletin it references (Requirement; Note).\n\n(Sections cited: Applicability; Requirement; Note; Compliance; Background.)"},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This is a discrete, targeted safety directive addressing a specific manufacturing defect in fire suppression systems. It has not expanded beyond its original purpose of ensuring correct installation of cargo fire protection components."},"complexity_factors":["Very short document (under 300 words)","Only 1 defined applicability criterion (specific Boeing model series)","Single requirement referencing external technical document rather than spelling out detailed steps","No nested exceptions or conditional logic","No cross-references to other legislation beyond the single FAA AD reference","Straightforward compliance deadline structure"],"plain_english_summary":"This is an **Airworthiness Directive (AD)** — essentially a mandatory safety order issued by Australia's Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) for aircraft.\n\n**What it does:**\nIt requires owners and operators of **Boeing 767 aircraft** to inspect the fire extinguisher systems in their cargo holds (the compartments where luggage and freight are stored). Specifically, they must check that the \"orifices\" (the small openings where fire suppressant sprays out) are the correct parts and were installed properly.\n\n**Why this matters:**\nThe manufacturer (Boeing) discovered that some fire protection components may have been installed incorrectly during production. If the wrong parts are fitted, the fire suppression system might not work properly in an emergency — meaning a cargo fire could go unchecked, with potentially catastrophic consequences.\n\n**Who must comply:**\nAnyone operating Boeing 767 series aircraft that are listed in Boeing's Alert Service Bulletin 767-26A0068 Revision 1. This typically means airlines and cargo operators flying these planes in Australian airspace or under Australian registration.\n\n**What they must do:**\nFollow the technical instructions set out in the corresponding US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) directive (AD 90-26-02), specifically Parts B and C. The deadline for compliance was 21 March 1991."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-b767-53-cargo-fire-protection","history":"/api/acts/ad-b767-53-cargo-fire-protection/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-b767-53-cargo-fire-protection/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-b767-53-cargo-fire-protection/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-b767-53-cargo-fire-protection/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-b767-53-cargo-fire-protection/documents"}}