{"id":"F2006B03393","name":"AD/B767/38 Amdt 2 - Engine Fire and Overheat Detection System","slug":"ad-b767-38-amdt-2-engine-fire-and-overheat-detection-system","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":42934,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B03393-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"AD/B767/38 Amdt 2 - Engine Fire and Overheat Detection System","content":"COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nBoeing 767 Series Aeroplanes\n\nAD/B767/38\n\nAmdt 2\n\n  \nEngine Fire and Overheat Detection System 11/93\n\nApplicability: All model 767 series aeroplanes fitted with Kidde engine fire and overheat detection systems as listed in Boeing SB 767-26-0037 Revision 3 dated 8 July 1993.\n\nRequirement: Modify the engine fire and overheat detection system in accordance with Boeing SB 767-26-0037 Revision 3 dated 8 July 1993.\n\nNote: FAA AD 90-05-05 Amendment 39-6516 refers.\n\nCompliance: Unless previously accomplished, prior to 31 March 1994.\n\nBackground: This Directive is prompted by numerous instances of false fire and overheat warnings that have resulted in engine in-flight shutdowns and aircraft diversions. This condition, if not corrected, could result in unnecessary engine in-flight shutdowns and aircraft diversions that unduly jeopardise continued safe operation of the aircraft.\n\nAmendment 1 to this Directive was issued to reflect additional work required by Revision 2 of the Service Bulletin.\n\nAmendment 2 is issued following release of Revision 3 of the Service Bulletin, which requires additional work for some aircraft.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This is a discrete, single-issue airworthiness directive focused specifically on the engine fire detection system modification. It has not expanded beyond its original safety purpose. The amendments (1 and 2) merely incorporated updated technical instructions from the manufacturer (Boeing) as they became available, without broadening the scope to other aircraft systems or issues."},"complexity_factors":["Very short document (under 300 words)","Only 1 defined term implicitly referenced (the Service Bulletin)","No nested conditional logic or cross-references to other legislation","Single straightforward requirement with clear applicability criteria","Simple compliance deadline with one exception ('unless previously accomplished')","Background narrative is explanatory rather than legally operative"],"plain_english_summary":"CASA requires operators of Boeing 767 aircraft fitted with Kidde engine fire/overheat detection systems (as listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 767-26-0037 Rev 3) to modify those systems per the Boeing technical instructions. The upgrade corrects false fire/overheat warnings that led to in-flight engine shutdowns and emergency diversions. This is Amendment 2; work was required by 31 March 1994."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"Scope expanded from the original AD: Amendment 1 added work required by SB Revision 2, and Amendment 2 follows SB Revision 3 which requires additional tasks for some aircraft. Applicability still targets all Model 767s fitted with the listed Kidde systems, but the content of required work broadened (Amendment 1 & Amendment 2 statements)."},"complexity_factors":["Single clear technical requirement: modify detection system per Boeing SB 767-26-0037 Rev 3 (Requirement).","Safety-critical nature increases operational and regulatory scrutiny (Background).","Some aircraft require additional work introduced by Revision 3, creating variability in labour/time per aircraft (Amendment 2).","Fixed compliance deadline (prior to 31 March 1994) imposes scheduling pressure on operators (Compliance).","Cross-reference to FAA AD 90-05-05 creates inter-jurisdictional alignment considerations (Note).","Costs and aircraft downtime borne by operators; no explicit funding or exemptions in the text (implied from Requirement/Compliance)."],"plain_english_summary":"Requires operators of Boeing 767s fitted with Kidde engine fire and overheat detection systems to modify those systems according to Boeing Service Bulletin 767-26-0037 Revision 3 by 31 March 1994. The mandatory modification is safety-critical and aims to prevent false fire/overheat warnings that previously led to unnecessary engine shutdowns and diversions.\n\nOperators pay for and schedule the work and associated downtime; Revision 3 adds extra tasks for some aircraft. The AD cross-references FAA AD 90-05-05."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-b767-38-amdt-2-engine-fire-and-overheat-detection-system","history":"/api/acts/ad-b767-38-amdt-2-engine-fire-and-overheat-detection-system/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-b767-38-amdt-2-engine-fire-and-overheat-detection-system/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-b767-38-amdt-2-engine-fire-and-overheat-detection-system/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-b767-38-amdt-2-engine-fire-and-overheat-detection-system/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-b767-38-amdt-2-engine-fire-and-overheat-detection-system/documents"}}