{"id":"F2006B03379","name":"AD/B767/22 Amdt 2 - Engine Overheat, Fire Detection and Fire Extinguishing Systems","slug":"ad-b767-22-amdt-2-engine-overheat-fire-detection-and-fire-extinguishing-systems","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":42881,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B03379-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"AD/B767/22 Amdt 2 - Engine Overheat, Fire Detection and Fire Extinguishing Systems","content":"COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nBoeing 767 Series Aeroplanes\n\nAD/B767/22\n\nAmdt 2\n\n  \n\nEngine Overheat, Fire Detection and Fire Extinguishing Systems\n\n  \n13/89\n\nApplicability: All Boeing 767 series aircraft.\n\nRequirement: 1. Engine Fire/Overheat Detection and Warning Systems\n\nCarry out a functional check of each system in accordance with Boeing Telex, M-7201-89-0196 dated 31 January 1989 as corrected by Boeing Telex,\n\nM-7201-89-0271 dated 13 February 1989.\n\nNote: Operators who have previously accomplished the functional checks required by this Paragraph in accordance with Boeing Telex M-7201-89-0196 dated 31 January are considered to have complied with this requirement.\n\n    2. Engine Fire Extinguishing System Wiring and Plumbing\n\nCarry out a functional check of the wiring and plumbing in accordance with Boeing Telex M-7201-89-0199 dated 31 January 1989.\n\n    3. Lower Cargo Compartment Smoke/Fire Detection System\n\nCarry out a functional check in accordance with Boeing Telex M-7201-89-0201 dated 31 January 1989.\n\n    4. Cargo Compartment Fire Extinguishing System\n\nCarry out a functional check of the wiring in accordance with Boeing Telex M- 7201-89-0198, dated 31 January, and of the plumbing in accordance with FAA AD 88-13-04 Amendment 39-5947.\n\nNote: FAA AD 89-03-51 refers.\n\nCompliance: Unless previously accomplished, within 25 days from 28 December 1989, and thereafter before next flight following any maintenance action involving engine overheat, fire detection and/or fire extinguishing systems which could possibly result in cross-connection of mis-connection of any system wiring or plumbing.\n\nNote: The Requirement documents referenced above supersede FAA AD T89-02-51, FAA AD T89-03-51, Boeing Telex M-7201-89-0146, and CAA (Aust) Direct Mail AD/B767/21, and include the requirements of those AD’s. Inspections previously completed are not required to be repeated unless noted or specified in the Requirement documents referenced in this AD.\n\nCOMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\nBackground: There have been reports in the last several months of improperly installed wiring and/or plumbing in the engine and cargo compartment fire protection system on various model Boeing aircraft. Whilst the cause of these problems has not been identified in each case, the FAA has determined that, due to design similarity or common production lines, these conditions are likely to exist on other fire protection systems of other Boeing aircraft not covered by previous AD action, and that as a precautionary measure, checks must be performed on specified aircraft.\n\nAmendment 1 to this AD is issued to reflect a revision of the Requirement documentation references.\n\nAmendment 2 to this AD is issued to correct an error in the correcting telex reference number of Requirement 1.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"A positive credit balance is required for all requests, including BYOK, so fallback providers remain available. Add credits at https://vercel.com/d?to=%2F%5Bteam%5D%2F%7E%2Fai%3Fmodal%3Dtop-up to continue.","source":"analysis-cron"},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This Airworthiness Directive maintains its original scope. Amendment 1 updated documentation references, and Amendment 2 corrected a typographical error in a telex reference number. Neither amendment expanded the substantive requirements beyond the original intent of ensuring fire protection system integrity on Boeing 767 aircraft."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple amendment layers (original + Amendment 1 + Amendment 2) creating version tracking complexity","Cross-references to external documents: 4 Boeing Telex documents, 2 FAA Airworthiness Directives, and 1 previous Australian AD","Conditional compliance logic: 'unless previously accomplished' clauses and maintenance-triggered re-inspection requirements","Technical aviation terminology requiring domain knowledge (telex references, plumbing/wiring cross-connection risks)","Nested note structure with supersession clauses cancelling previous directives"],"plain_english_summary":"This safety directive orders Australian operators of Boeing 767s to inspect engine and cargo fire detection and fire‑extinguishing wiring and plumbing to confirm warnings and suppression will work. It targets operators and maintenance crews because reports of incorrect installations could prevent fire warnings or extinguisher operation. Initial compliance was required within 25 days of 28 Dec 1989, with a re‑check before the next flight after any maintenance that might affect connections. Previous Boeing‑compliant checks are accepted."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"Amendments recorded in the AD adjust documentary references and correct a telex reference number (Amendment 1 revised Requirement document references; Amendment 2 corrected an error in a telex reference). Those are administrative corrections to which documents are to be followed; they do not expand the population of affected aircraft, add new obligations beyond the four functional checks, or materially broaden the AD’s technical scope."},"complexity_factors":["Short document (single AD) with 4 clear requirement paragraphs","Relies on external documents (4 Boeing Telexes and 1 FAA AD) — cross-references increase implementation complexity","Simple conditional timing: \"within 25 days from 28 December 1989\" and recurring requirement \"before next flight\" after certain maintenance","Administrative notes superseding prior ADs (cross-reference to earlier instruments), but no layered exceptions or broad discretionary powers","Limited number of defined technical items (wiring, plumbing, detection, extinguishing) and no nested exceptions"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this instrument does (mechanics)**\n\n- Requires operators of *all* Boeing 767 series aeroplanes to carry out specified functional checks of engine and cargo fire-protection equipment. The checks are to be performed exactly as set out in the Boeing Telex documents and an FAA AD referenced in the directive: \n  - Requirement 1: Functional check of engine fire/overheat detection and warning systems (Boeing Telex M-7201-89-0196 corrected by M-7201-89-0271) \n  - Requirement 2: Functional check of engine fire extinguishing system wiring and plumbing (Boeing Telex M-7201-89-0199) \n  - Requirement 3: Functional check of lower cargo compartment smoke/fire detection system (Boeing Telex M-7201-89-0201) \n  - Requirement 4: Functional check of cargo compartment fire extinguishing system wiring and plumbing (Boeing Telex M-7201-89-0198 and FAA AD 88-13-04 Amendment 39-5947)\n\n- Sets when the checks must be done: unless already completed, within 25 days from 28 December 1989, and thereafter before the next flight following any maintenance that could have caused mis-connection or cross-connection of the relevant wiring or plumbing.\n\n- States that the listed Requirement documents supersede earlier related ADs and telexes, and that previously completed inspections need not be repeated except where the Requirement documents specify otherwise.\n\n**Who this affects**\n\n- Aircraft operators and owners of Boeing 767 series aeroplanes (airlines, lessors, charter operators). \n- Maintenance organisations and engineering staff who perform the functional checks and any corrective work. \n- Potentially parts suppliers/contractors if remedial wiring or plumbing work is required and is outsourced.\n\n**Why it matters (stated purpose and practical effect)**\n\n- Stated purpose: The AD responds to reports of improperly installed wiring and/or plumbing in engine and cargo fire protection systems on Boeing aircraft. The FAA judged similar conditions could exist on other Boeing types; this AD requires precautionary checks for Boeing 767s. (Background section.) \n\n- Practical effect: the checks are intended to detect mis-routed, mis-connected or otherwise improperly installed wiring/plumbing in the fire detection and extinguishing systems so that faults can be corrected before flight.\n\n**Costs, incentives and trade-offs**\n\n- Who pays: the aircraft operator (or its maintenance contractor) pays for labour, parts and aircraft downtime required to perform the checks and any remedial work. (See Compliance timing.)\n\n- Incentives created: operators are incentivised to perform the checks promptly to remain compliant and avoid regulatory action; they must also ensure correct reconnection after any maintenance that could affect the systems (creates an ongoing operational compliance duty — see Compliance paragraph). \n\n- Opportunity cost and productivity impact: the AD imposes short-term workload and potential aircraft out-of-service time (within the 25‑day window and whenever implicated maintenance occurs). That may reduce available flight capacity or require schedule adjustments while checks/repairs are made.\n\n- Effects on maintenance market and contracting: the directive channels work to authorised maintenance providers or in-house teams with the competencies to follow Boeing telex procedures — increasing demand for qualified technicians and potentially creation of short-term consulting/repair work. Operators may subcontract checks to approved MROs.\n\n**Implementation and compliance risk**\n\n- Dependence on documentation: compliance requires access to the specified Boeing Telexes and the referenced FAA AD and following them precisely. Any ambiguity or delay in obtaining those documents could hinder prompt compliance (Requirement paragraphs 1–4). \n\n- Technical competence: functional checks and any corrective wiring/plumbing work require appropriately trained personnel and tooling; lack of skills can delay rectification or produce inconsistent inspections.\n\n- Enforcement discretion: the AD sets prescriptive technical steps and timelines; the regulator enforces compliance but corrective action specifics are determined by maintenance organisations following the referenced telexes.\n\n**Concrete behavioural changes required**\n\n- Operators must schedule and perform the prescribed functional checks within 25 days of 28 December 1989 (unless already done) and must repeat or perform checks any time maintenance that might mis‑connect wiring/plumbing is carried out — before the next flight after such maintenance. (Compliance paragraph.)\n\n- If inspections reveal faults, operators must carry out corrective repairs following the telexes or FAA AD procedures.\n\n**Notes and cross-references**\n\n- The AD states the Requirement documents supersede earlier ADs and telexes; previously completed inspections are not automatically required to be repeated unless the Requirement documents say so (Note under Compliance). \n\n- Amendment history in this text corrects a telex reference number and revised requirement document references; those are administrative corrections to the documentation citations rather than changes to the substantive checks required.\n\n"}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-b767-22-amdt-2-engine-overheat-fire-detection-and-fire-extinguishing-systems","history":"/api/acts/ad-b767-22-amdt-2-engine-overheat-fire-detection-and-fire-extinguishing-systems/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-b767-22-amdt-2-engine-overheat-fire-detection-and-fire-extinguishing-systems/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-b767-22-amdt-2-engine-overheat-fire-detection-and-fire-extinguishing-systems/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-b767-22-amdt-2-engine-overheat-fire-detection-and-fire-extinguishing-systems/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-b767-22-amdt-2-engine-overheat-fire-detection-and-fire-extinguishing-systems/documents"}}