{"id":"F2006B03361","name":"AD/B767/186 - Passenger Address & Entertainment System Video Control Centre","slug":"ad-b767-186-passenger-address-entertainment-system-video-control-centre","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":42811,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B03361-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"Model ASB","sectionType":"part","heading":"Model ASB","content":"# Model ASB","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes","sectionType":"part","heading":"Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes","content":"# Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes\n\nAD/B767/186 (continued)\n\nBackground: This Directive requires the modification of the passenger address and entertainment system VCC wire bundles and, if necessary, an operational test. This action is necessary to prevent chafing of the wire bundles of the VCC against the rudder and/ or elevator control cables, which could result in arcing of the wires in the wire bundles and severing of the cables. Severed cables, if combined with an engine-out during takeoff, or a high crosswind during takeoff or landing, could result in reduced controllability of the aeroplane.\n\n![Signature of James Coyne, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.](image.002.png)  \n\nJim Coyne\n\nDelegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 25 July 2003\n\n![](image.001.png)  \n\nThe above AD is notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 13 August 2003.","sortOrder":2}],"analysis":{"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The AD sets a specific safety requirement: modification of the passenger address and entertainment system VCC wire bundles and, if necessary, an operational test, to prevent chafing and potential severing of rudder/elevator control cables. The text does not indicate any change in scope from a prior requirement or amendment; it presents the requirement and its safety rationale as the instrument's intended scope. (Background; Jim Coyne signature; Gazette note)"},"complexity_factors":["Safety-critical wiring modification affecting flight control cable proximity (technical precision required). (Background)","Possible requirement for an operational test “if necessary,” introducing conditional compliance steps. (Background)","Need for access to VCC wiring and control-cable routing inside the airframe, requiring certified maintenance personnel. (Background)","Document does not include detailed procedural steps, parts lists or work scope; operators must obtain and follow separate maintenance instructions or service documents. (Background)","Operational impacts on scheduling and aircraft downtime for modification and testing. (Background)"],"plain_english_summary":"### What this instrument does (mechanically)\n\nThis Airworthiness Directive, AD/B767/186, requires modification of the wire bundles that service the Passenger Address and Entertainment System Video Control Centre (VCC) on Boeing 767 series aeroplanes. Where necessary, operators must also perform an operational test after the modification. (Background)\n\n### Who it affects\n\n- Aircraft operators and owners of Boeing 767 series aeroplanes that use the affected VCC wiring. (Background)\n- Approved maintenance organisations and technicians who must carry out the modification and any required tests. (Background)\n\n### Why it matters (stated purpose and the mechanical risk addressed)\n\nThe directive states the modification is necessary to stop the VCC wire bundles from chafing against rudder and/or elevator control cables. Chafing could cause electrical arcing in the VCC bundle and could sever the control cables. The AD notes severed control cables, combined with certain flight conditions (engine-out during takeoff or a high crosswind on takeoff or landing), could reduce the aeroplane's controllability. (Background)\n\n### Who pays, who decides, and what behaviour changes\n\n- Who pays: The aircraft operator or owner pays for the modification work and any operational testing. The AD contains no provision for reimbursement. (Background)\n- Who decides: The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) issued the directive; compliance is mandatory for affected aircraft. The AD was signed by a CASA delegate on 25 July 2003 and notified in the Commonwealth Gazette on 13 August 2003. (Jim Coyne signature; Gazette note)\n- Behaviour changes required: Operators must schedule and perform the specified wiring modifications and, where required, conduct operational tests. Maintenance providers must follow the AD when certifying the work. (Background)\n\n### Costs, incentives, trade-offs, and implementation risks\n\n- Direct costs: Time, labour and parts to modify the VCC wire bundles and possibly test aircraft systems. Those costs fall on operators/owners because the AD does not specify compensation. (Background)\n- Operational impact: Aircraft will need downtime to complete the work and testing, which has an opportunity cost for flight operations and scheduling. (Background)\n- Compliance burden: Operators must locate affected aeroplanes, arrange approved maintenance, perform the modification, and record compliance. The AD text does not provide the step-by-step procedure or parts list, so operators will need to follow the referenced maintenance instructions or service documents in practice. (Background)\n- Implementation risk: The safety benefit depends on the modification being correctly performed; incomplete or incorrect work could leave the chafing risk unmitigated. The AD adds an operational test requirement “if necessary,” creating a condition-based compliance element. (Background)\n\n### Market and enterprise effects\n\n- Competition and ownership: The AD imposes a uniform safety requirement on all operators of affected Boeing 767s. It does not change ownership rights or market structure. Operators can choose which approved maintenance provider performs the work, subject to regulatory certification requirements. (Background)\n- Service providers: Maintenance organisations and parts suppliers may see increased demand for the specific modification work and inspections.\n\n### Concentration of benefits and costs\n\n- Benefits (reduced risk of control-cable severance and related loss of controllability) are diffuse — they accrue to passengers, crew and the general public who fly on or are affected by the aircraft. (Background)\n- Costs are concentrated on the owners/operators of the affected aeroplanes, who must fund and schedule the modification and tests. (Background)\n\n### Implementation pointers (from the document)\n\n- The AD text identifies the mechanical hazard and prescribes modification plus an operational test where necessary but does not itself contain detailed engineering instructions or parts lists. Operators will need to implement the AD via the applicable maintenance instructions or service bulletins. (Background)\n- The directive was signed by a CASA delegate on 25 July 2003 and published in the Commonwealth Gazette on 13 August 2003, establishing its regulatory effect and compliance timeline. (Jim Coyne signature; Gazette note)"},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This is a discrete, targeted safety directive addressing a specific wiring defect in Boeing 767 aircraft. It has not expanded beyond its original purpose of mandating a particular modification to prevent wire chafing. Airworthiness directives are inherently narrow in scope by design."},"complexity_factors":["Very short document (approximately 200 words of substantive content)","Single, specific technical requirement (wire bundle modification)","No defined terms section — technical terms (VCC, arcing, chafing) are used in their ordinary engineering sense","No cross-references to other legislation or regulations","Simple conditional structure: one mandatory action with one optional follow-up ('if necessary')","Clear causal chain explaining the safety risk (chafing → arcing → severed cables → loss of controllability)","Standardised format typical of airworthiness directives with minimal procedural detail"],"plain_english_summary":"This is an **Airworthiness Directive (AD)** — essentially a mandatory safety order issued by Australia's aviation regulator, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA).\n\n**What it does:**\nIt requires airlines and aircraft operators flying Boeing 767 series planes to modify the wiring in the **Passenger Address & Entertainment System Video Control Centre (VCC)**. Specifically, they must:\n- Reroute or protect certain wire bundles to stop them rubbing against flight control cables\n- Run an operational test if needed to confirm everything works properly\n\n**Why it matters:**\nWithout this fix, wires could **chafe** (wear through their insulation by rubbing) against the rudder and elevator control cables. This creates two serious risks:\n1. **Electrical arcing** (sparks/jumping electricity) from damaged wires\n2. **Severed control cables** — meaning the pilots could lose control of the plane's steering or pitch\n\nIf control cables snap during critical moments like takeoff with one engine failed, or landing in strong crosswinds, the pilots might not be able to control the aircraft properly.\n\n**Who it affects:**\n- Airlines and operators flying Boeing 767 aircraft in Australia\n- Maintenance engineers responsible for keeping these planes airworthy\n\n**The bottom line:** This is a **safety-critical maintenance order**. It doesn't change the law for passengers, but it ensures the planes they fly on won't have wiring that could cut vital flight controls."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-b767-186-passenger-address-entertainment-system-video-control-centre","history":"/api/acts/ad-b767-186-passenger-address-entertainment-system-video-control-centre/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-b767-186-passenger-address-entertainment-system-video-control-centre/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-b767-186-passenger-address-entertainment-system-video-control-centre/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-b767-186-passenger-address-entertainment-system-video-control-centre/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-b767-186-passenger-address-entertainment-system-video-control-centre/documents"}}