{"id":"F2006B03319","name":"AD/B767/142 - Oxygen Generators","slug":"ad-b767-142-oxygen-generators","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":42756,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B03319-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE","sectionType":"part","heading":"AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE","content":"# ![](image.001.png)  \nAIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE\n\nFor the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.\n\n![](image.001.png)\n\nBoeing 767 Series Aeroplanes","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"AD/B767/142 Oxygen Generators 7/2001 DM","sectionType":"part","heading":"AD/B767/142 Oxygen Generators 7/2001 DM","content":"# AD/B767/142 Oxygen Generators 7/2001 DM\n\nApplicability: Model 767 series aeroplanes, equipped with chemical oxygen generators, as listed in the following Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletins:\n\nB767-35-0043 dated 1 March 2001, and\n\nB767-35-0044 dated 1 March 2001.\n\nRequirement: 1. For airplanes having any chemical oxygen generator and/or passenger, attendant, or lavatory service unit assembly that contains a chemical oxygen generator that has been replaced, carry out a detailed visual inspection of the chemical oxygen generator of the applicable assembly to verify correct installation of the release pin in the generator firing mechanism in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of either Service Bulletin (SB) B767-35-0043 or B767-35-0044, as applicable.\n\nNote 1: For the purposes of this Directive, a detailed visual inspection is defined as: \"An intensive visual examination of a specific structural area, system, installation, or assembly to detect damage, failure, or irregularity. Available lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at intensity deemed appropriate by the inspector. Inspection aids such as mirror, magnifying lenses, etc., may be used. Surface cleaning and elaborate access procedures may be required.\"\n\nNote 2: The release pin and safety pin are located in the generator firing mechanism. The safety pin hole is the hole in the generator firing mechanism that is closest to the main body of the generator. The release pin hole is the hole in the generator firing mechanism located furthest from the main body of the generator. The centre axis of the release pin hole is perpendicular to the centre axis of the safety pin hole.\n\nNote 3: Inspections and corrective action carried out before the effective date of this Directive, per Boeing Telex M-7200-00-02474, dated 9, 13, 19, or 31October 2000; or Boeing Telex M-7200-00-03040, dated 18 December 2000; are considered acceptable for compliance with the initial inspection and corrective action specified in Requirement 1. However, prior accomplishment of the inspections and corrective action specified in the telexes does not eliminate the need for the inspection each time an oxygen generator is replaced.","sortOrder":1}],"analysis":{"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This is a standard Airworthiness Directive with focused, narrow scope. It addresses a specific safety issue (oxygen generator installation) on a specific aircraft type (Boeing 767) using specific Boeing service bulletins. The scope remains tightly constrained to the original safety purpose with no evidence of scope creep."},"complexity_factors":["Short, single-purpose directive (approximately 400 words)","Only 3 defined terms in notes (detailed visual inspection, release pin hole, safety pin hole)","Simple conditional structure: one main requirement with applicability limited to specific Boeing service bulletins","One exception/recognition clause (Note 3 regarding prior inspections under Boeing telexes)","No cross-references to other legislation beyond subregulation 39.1(1) of CAR 1998","Clear, sequential organization: Applicability → Requirement → Notes → Compliance implied"],"plain_english_summary":"This CASA safety order requires operators and maintenance crews for Boeing 767s to perform a detailed visual inspection of chemical oxygen generators after any replacement, confirming the release pin is correctly fitted per Boeing service instructions. It targets seat, cabin attendant and lavatory units to prevent failures to deploy oxygen or accidental activations that could deny emergency oxygen or cause fire or injury."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This directive remains tightly focused on a single unsafe condition: verifying correct installation of the release pin in certain chemical oxygen generators. It prescribes inspection procedures and allows specific prior telex inspections to satisfy the initial compliance obligation while preserving the ongoing requirement to inspect each time a generator is replaced. There is no material expansion of scope beyond that original safety-fix purpose."},"complexity_factors":["Single substantive requirement (Requirement 1) with limited conditionality","Two Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletins referenced (B767-35-0043 and B767-35-0044)","Three explanatory notes including a formal definition of \"detailed visual inspection\" (Note 1) and pin-location details (Note 2)","Cross-reference to prior Boeing telexes that can satisfy initial compliance (Note 3)","Limited number of defined terms and short overall text (low nesting and few exceptions)"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this directive does (mechanics)\n\n- Requires operators of Boeing 767 aeroplanes that have certain chemical oxygen generators to carry out a detailed visual inspection of each generator’s firing mechanism to check the release pin is correctly installed. (Requirement 1.)\n- The inspection must be done in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin B767-35-0043 or B767-35-0044, as applicable. (Applicability and Requirement 1.)\n- Previous inspections and corrective actions done under specific Boeing telexes dated October–December 2000 satisfy the initial inspection requirement, but they do not remove the obligation to inspect each time an oxygen generator is replaced. (Note 3.)\n\n**Who this affects\n\n- Airline operators and owners of Boeing 767 series aircraft that are fitted with the chemical oxygen generators listed in the two Boeing service bulletins referenced. They must ensure inspections are done and any corrective action followed.\n- Maintenance organisations and technicians who perform the inspections and any corrective work must follow the Boeing service bulletin instructions.\n- The regulator (CASA) enforces the directive under CAR 1998 subregulation 39.1(1).\n\n**Why it matters (stated purpose and operational impact)\n\n- The stated safety concern is the potential for incorrect installation of the release pin in the oxygen generator firing mechanism. The release pin position is critical to prevent accidental activation or to ensure proper functioning when the generator is needed. The directive’s explicit purpose is to correct that unsafe condition by mandating inspections (Requirement 1; Notes 2 and 3).\n\n**Practical effects, costs and incentives (analysis)\n\n- Who pays: aircraft operators bear the direct costs — inspection labour, possible removals/replacements of generators, and any aircraft downtime while work is done. \n- Who decides and how: CASA issues the AD and delegates are the legal decision-makers enforcing compliance; the technical steps are specified by Boeing service bulletins (operators must follow those SB instructions). \n- Behaviour change required: operators must inspect each chemical oxygen generator when it has been replaced (and follow corrective action if the release pin is incorrect). Previously performed telex inspections can count once for initial compliance but do not remove the ongoing per-replacement inspection requirement (Note 3).\n- Dependency on manufacturer material: compliance is tied to Boeing service bulletins and earlier Boeing telexes, which concentrates the technical instructions with the manufacturer and requires operators/maintainers to follow those documents.\n- Implementation risks and compliance burden: the inspection is a human visual check (albeit a defined, intensive one — see Note 1) so there is residual risk of human error or inconsistent judgement. The directive creates recurring maintenance events each time a generator is replaced, increasing repetitive workload for operators who change generators frequently.\n- Trade-offs and opportunity costs: the AD reduces the risk of accidental activation or failure of oxygen generators at the price of inspection time, possible replacement parts, and aircraft out-of-service time. The directive does not prescribe replacement unless the inspection finds incorrect installation; it requires following Boeing’s corrective actions where applicable.\n\n**Key definitions and practical points operators must note\n\n- \"Detailed visual inspection\" is defined in the AD (Note 1) — it is more intensive than a casual check and may require lighting, inspection aids (mirrors, magnifiers), surface cleaning, and access procedures.\n- The AD distinguishes the release pin hole and the safety pin hole by location relative to the generator body and by axis orientation (Note 2) — inspectors must check the correct hole and pin position.\n- The AD applies only to 767 aircraft equipped with the specific oxygen generators listed in Boeing SBs B767-35-0043 or B767-35-0044 (Applicability). Operators must confirm whether their installed equipment is listed.\n\n(References: Requirement 1; Notes 1–3; Applicability.)"},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"A positive credit balance is required for all requests, including BYOK, so fallback providers remain available. Add credits at https://vercel.com/d?to=%2F%5Bteam%5D%2F%7E%2Fai%3Fmodal%3Dtop-up to continue.","source":"analysis-cron"}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-b767-142-oxygen-generators","history":"/api/acts/ad-b767-142-oxygen-generators/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-b767-142-oxygen-generators/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-b767-142-oxygen-generators/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-b767-142-oxygen-generators/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-b767-142-oxygen-generators/documents"}}