{"id":"F2006B03275","name":"AD/B747/97 - Cargo Fire Extinguishing Agent Containers","slug":"ad-b747-97-cargo-fire-extinguishing-agent-containers","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":42707,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B03275-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"AD/B747/97 - Cargo Fire Extinguishing Agent Containers","content":"COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nBoeing 747 Series Aeroplanes\n\nAD/B747/97 Cargo Fire Extinguishing Agent Containers 9/91\n\nApplicability: Model 747-400 series as listed in Boeing SB 747-26A 2180.\n\nRequirement: Action in accordance with the Technical Requirements of FAA AD 91-12-03 Amdt 39-7014.\n\nCompliance: As specified in the Requirement Document with a revised effective date of 5 September 1991 for Australian registered aircraft.\n\nBackground: The FAA has received a report from one operator identifying two occurrences of false indication of low pressure in the cargo compartment fire extinguishing containers.\n\nThis condition, if not corrected, could reduce or stop the discharge of fire extinguishing agent due to water freezing in the metered distribution lines, and could cause false low pressure indications in the initial discharge indicating system.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The instrument adopts the FAA AD's technical requirements for the specified Boeing 747-400 aircraft and simply sets a revised effective date for Australian-registered aeroplanes. It does not expand or narrow the class of affected aircraft or the remedial measures described in the FAA AD; therefore the scope of required action remains aligned with the FAA directive referenced. (See: \"Requirement\" and \"Compliance\")."},"complexity_factors":["Cross-reference to an external technical document (FAA AD 91-12-03 Amdt 39-7014) rather than reproducing details","Limited target population (Boeing 747-400 series as listed in Boeing SB 747-26A 2180) requiring operators to check the service bulletin list","Safety-critical technical actions required (inspection/modification of fire-extinguishing system) which may need specialist maintenance resources","Compliance timeline specified by an effective date (5 September 1991) that operators must meet","Regulatory adoption approach (CASA adopting FAA requirements) reduces local discretion but requires coordination with foreign AD text"],"plain_english_summary":"### What this instrument does (mechanically)\n\nThis Airworthiness Directive (AD) requires Australian operators of certain Boeing 747-400 aeroplanes to carry out the specific technical actions set out in a matching United States FAA directive (FAA AD 91-12-03 Amdt 39-7014). The Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) makes compliance with those FAA technical requirements mandatory for affected Australian-registered aircraft, with an effective date of 5 September 1991 for those aircraft. (See: \"Applicability\", \"Requirement\", \"Compliance\".)\n\n### Who it affects\n\n- Operators and maintainers of Boeing 747-400 series aircraft listed in Boeing SB 747-26A 2180. (See: \"Applicability\").\n\n### Why the rule exists (official rationale and mechanism)\n\n- The FAA received reports from an operator of two incidents where cargo fire-extinguishing containers falsely indicated low pressure. (See: \"Background\").\n- The reported cause is water freezing in metered distribution lines, which can either stop or reduce the discharge of extinguishing agent and can produce false low-pressure indications during initial discharge. The AD requires the FAA-prescribed technical actions intended to address that condition. (See: \"Background\" and \"Requirement\").\n\n### Who pays and who decides\n\n- Who pays: aircraft operators pay the direct costs (inspection, modification, repair, parts, and any associated downtime) required to meet the FAA technical requirements adopted by CASA. (See: \"Requirement\" and \"Compliance\").\n- Who decides: CASA has adopted the FAA AD as the mandatory action for Australian-registered aeroplanes; the technical content and remedial steps come from the FAA AD referenced in this instrument. (See: \"Requirement\" and \"Compliance\").\n\n### What behaviour changes are required\n\n- Operators must perform the specific inspections, modifications or repairs described in FAA AD 91-12-03 Amdt 39-7014 for the listed 747-400 aircraft. The AD makes those actions compulsory for Australian-registered aeroplanes from the revised effective date. (See: \"Requirement\" and \"Compliance\").\n\n### Implementation and compliance considerations\n\n- The AD cross-references an external FAA document for the technical requirements rather than reproducing detailed steps, so affected parties must obtain and follow FAA AD 91-12-03 Amdt 39-7014 to know the exact tasks. (See: \"Requirement\").\n- The instrument sets an effective date for Australian-registered aircraft (5 September 1991), which sets the compliance timeline. (See: \"Compliance\").\n- The safety risk addressed is specific and technical: water freezing in metered distribution lines can prevent proper discharge of fire extinguishing agent and can cause misleading low-pressure indications; the remedial measures are intended to remove that failure mode. (See: \"Background\").\n\n### Trade-offs and operational impacts to note\n\n- The directive imposes a compliance cost on operators (maintenance actions and potential aircraft downtime). (See: \"Requirement\" and \"Compliance\").\n- The CASA AD delegates the substantive technical prescription to the FAA AD, limiting further technical discretion in this instrument itself; operators must follow the FAA-prescribed measures. (See: \"Requirement\").\n\nReferences: Applicability; Requirement (FAA AD 91-12-03 Amdt 39-7014); Compliance (revised effective date 5 September 1991); Background (reports of false low-pressure indications due to water freezing)."},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This is a standard Airworthiness Directive implementing a specific safety fix for a defined aircraft type. It has not expanded beyond its original purpose of addressing the cargo fire extinguishing container defect."},"complexity_factors":["Very short document (under 200 words)","Only 1 defined applicability reference (Boeing SB 747-26A 2180)","Single requirement: comply with external FAA directive","No nested conditions, exceptions, or cross-references within the instrument itself","Background section provides clear rationale without legal complexity"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this is:** This is an Airworthiness Directive (AD) — essentially a mandatory safety order issued by Australia's Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) for specific Boeing 747 aircraft.\n\n**What it does:** It requires owners and operators of Boeing 747-400 series planes to follow specific technical instructions from the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to fix a problem with cargo fire extinguishing systems.\n\n**The problem:** The fire suppression system in the cargo hold (where luggage and freight go) can give false \"low pressure\" warnings. Worse, water can freeze in the distribution lines, which could stop the fire extinguishing agent from working properly when needed.\n\n**Who it affects:** Anyone operating Boeing 747-400 aircraft registered in Australia that are covered by Boeing Service Bulletin 747-26A 2180.\n\n**What they must do:** Follow the technical steps laid out in FAA AD 91-12-03 (Amendment 39-7014) — a US safety order that Australia is adopting here.\n\n**When:** By 5 September 1991 for Australian-registered aircraft.\n\n**Why it matters:** Cargo fires on aircraft are extremely dangerous. If the fire suppression system fails or gives false readings, crews might not realise there's a fire, or the system might not work when activated. This directive closes that safety gap."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-b747-97-cargo-fire-extinguishing-agent-containers","history":"/api/acts/ad-b747-97-cargo-fire-extinguishing-agent-containers/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-b747-97-cargo-fire-extinguishing-agent-containers/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-b747-97-cargo-fire-extinguishing-agent-containers/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-b747-97-cargo-fire-extinguishing-agent-containers/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-b747-97-cargo-fire-extinguishing-agent-containers/documents"}}