{"id":"F2006B03127","name":"AD/B747/229 - Engine Thrust Control Cables","slug":"ad-b747-229-engine-thrust-control-cables","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":42499,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B03127-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE","sectionType":"part","heading":"AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE","content":"# AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE\n\n![](image.002.png)\n\n![](image.002.png)  \nFor the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"AD/B747/229 Engine Thrust Control Cables","sectionType":"part","heading":"AD/B747/229 Engine Thrust Control Cables 7/2000","content":"# AD/B747/229 Engine Thrust Control Cables 7/2000\n\nApplicability: Model 747-100, -100B, -100B SUD, -200B, -200C, -200F, -300, SR and SP series aircraft fitted with P&W JT9D-3 or \\-7 series engines, CF6-45 or \\-50 series engines or RB211-524B, C or D series engines.\n\nRequirement: Action in accordance with the technical requirements specified in FAA AD 2000-05- 30 Amendment 39-11640.\n\nNote: FAA AD 2000-05-30 Amendment 39-11640 refers.\n\nCompliance: At the time specified in the FAA AD except for a revised effective date of 13 July 2000.\n\nThis Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 13 July 2000.\n\nBackground: The FAA have identified an unsafe condition that relates to the effect of a thrust control cable failure on controllability of the aircraft. Should an engine control thrust “B” cable fail during landing, it changes the position of the thrust reverser directional control valve, causing the thrust reverser to stow and the engine to accelerate while the other engines remain in full reverse. This will result in a severe asymmetric condition during landing.\n\n![Signature of Eugene Paul Holzapfel, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.](image.003.png)  \n\nEugene Paul Holzapfel\n\nDelegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 2 June 2000\n\n![](image.002.png)  \n\nThe above AD is notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 14 June 2000.","sortOrder":1}],"analysis":{"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"A positive credit balance is required for all requests, including BYOK, so fallback providers remain available. Add credits at https://vercel.com/d?to=%2F%5Bteam%5D%2F%7E%2Fai%3Fmodal%3Dtop-up to continue.","source":"analysis-cron"},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"Scope was not changed: the AD adopts the FAA AD's technical requirements and the same applicability to affected 747s and engines; the only modification is a revised Australian effective date of 13 July 2000 (Requirement; Compliance)."},"complexity_factors":["Cross-reference to an external FAA AD (FAA AD 2000-05-30) rather than containing all technical steps (Requirement)","Multiple engine types and numerous 747 variants in the applicability list increase applicability mapping (Applicability)","Safety-critical mechanical failure mode with operational timing constraints (Background)","Regulatory timing adjustment (Australian effective date differs from FAA) creates coordination/implementation detail (Compliance)","Compliance depends on reading and applying another instrument, raising administrative and verification burden for operators"],"plain_english_summary":"This AD requires operators of specified Boeing 747-100/200/300/SR/SP series fitted with P&W JT9D, GE CF6‑45/50 or Rolls‑Royce RB211‑524 engines to carry out the inspections and corrective actions set out in FAA AD 2000‑05‑30. It affects aircraft operators and maintenance organisations because a failure of an engine thrust “B” cable during landing can stow a reverser and cause that engine to accelerate, producing severe asymmetric thrust; compliance follows the FAA AD timing (Requirement; Compliance; Applicability)."},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This is a standard airworthiness directive adopting a US FAA safety order. It maintains its original narrow scope: addressing a specific mechanical defect in specific Boeing 747 models. There is no evidence of scope creep — the directive does not expand beyond the original unsafe condition identified by the FAA."},"complexity_factors":["Very short document (approximately 250 words)","Only 3 substantive sections: Applicability, Requirement, and Compliance","Single cross-reference to external FAA directive (FAA AD 2000-05-30 Amendment 39-11640) — the actual technical work is delegated to this external document","No defined terms section — all terms are either common aviation terminology or explicitly listed (aircraft models, engine types)","No nested conditions or exceptions — straightforward 'applies to X, do Y by Z date' structure","Simple temporal trigger: effective date of 13 July 2000 with compliance tied to external FAA AD timing"],"plain_english_summary":"This AD requires operators of certain Boeing 747 variants (with specified Pratt & Whitney, GE or Rolls‑Royce engines) to inspect and remediate the engine thrust control \"B\" cable per FAA AD 2000‑05‑30; the Australian directive takes effect 13 July 2000.\n\nThe action prevents a failure that can let a thrust reverser stow while that engine advances, creating dangerous asymmetric thrust on landing and risk of loss of directional control."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-b747-229-engine-thrust-control-cables","history":"/api/acts/ad-b747-229-engine-thrust-control-cables/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-b747-229-engine-thrust-control-cables/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-b747-229-engine-thrust-control-cables/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-b747-229-engine-thrust-control-cables/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-b747-229-engine-thrust-control-cables/documents"}}