{"id":"F2006B02887","name":"AD/B737/186 - Aileron Tab Control Rod Barrel","slug":"ad-b737-186-aileron-tab-control-rod-barrel","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":42229,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B02887-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE","sectionType":"part","heading":"AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE","content":"# AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE\n\n![](image.001.png)\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nFor the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.\n\nBoeing 737 Series Aeroplanes","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"AD/B737/186 Aileron Tab Control Rod Barr","sectionType":"part","heading":"AD/B737/186 Aileron Tab Control Rod Barrel 8/2002","content":"# AD/B737/186 Aileron Tab Control Rod Barrel 8/2002\n\nApplicability: All Model 737-100, \\-200, \\-200C, \\-300, \\-400, and \\-500 series aircraft.\n\nRequirement: Action in accordance with the technical requirements of FAA AD 2002-10-12 Amdt 39-12758.\n\nNote: Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 737-27-1223, dated 21 October 1999, refers.\n\nCompliance: As specified in the Requirement document, with a revised effective date of 8 August 2002.\n\nThis Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 8 August 2002.\n\nBackground: During a repair of an aircraft outer wing following ground ha ndling damage, an aileron tab control rod barrel was found broken in half. Investigation revealed that an internal thread relief groove had been mislocated during manufacture to produce an extremely thin wall thickness. Failure of a tab control rod barrel could result in disconnection of the aileron tab, severe airframe vibration, consequent wing and control surface damage, and possible loss of control of the aircraft.\n\n![Signature of David Villiers, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.](image.002.jpeg)  \n\nDavid Alan Villiers\n\nDelegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 28 June 2002\n\n![](image.001.png)  \n\nThe above AD is notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 17 July 2002.","sortOrder":1}],"analysis":{"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"A positive credit balance is required for all requests, including BYOK, so fallback providers remain available. Add credits at https://vercel.com/d?to=%2F%5Bteam%5D%2F%7E%2Fai%3Fmodal%3Dtop-up to continue.","source":"analysis-cron"},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This AD maintains its original narrow scope: addressing a specific manufacturing defect in a specific aircraft component. It does not expand beyond the original safety issue identified."},"complexity_factors":["Very short document (under 300 words)","Only 1 defined term implicitly referenced (the FAA AD)","No nested conditional logic or exceptions","Single straightforward requirement: comply with external FAA document","No cross-references to other Australian legislation beyond the enabling regulation (CAR 1998 subreg 39.1(1))","Clear, linear structure: Applicability → Requirement → Compliance → Background"],"plain_english_summary":"CASA ordered operators of Boeing 737-100/200/200C/300/400/500 series to inspect and repair a manufacturing defect in the aileron-tab control-rod barrel that can fracture, causing severe vibration, wing damage or loss of control. It requires compliance with FAA AD 2002-10-12 (Boeing SB 737-27-1223); the order takes effect 8 August 2002."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This Australian AD adopts the technical requirements of the FAA AD for the same unsafe condition and applies them to the listed Boeing 737 models in Australia. The instrument does not expand the set of affected aircraft, nor add new technical obligations beyond those in the FAA AD; its only substantive local change is to set the Australian effective date (8 August 2002). Therefore the scope has not grown beyond the original safety-focused purpose."},"complexity_factors":["Short instrument (one-page style) with limited text","Single external normative cross-reference to FAA AD 2002-10-12 for technical steps","Secondary reference to Boeing Service Bulletin 737-27-1223 (informative)","Applicability limited to a defined list of 6 737 model groups","No nested exceptions or conditional sub-parts within the Australian AD","Administrative element only (revised effective date) rather than new technical content"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this instrument does (mechanically)\n\n- Requires operators of certain Boeing 737 models to carry out the inspection/repair actions set out in FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2002-10-12.  The Australian AD adopts the FAA AD's technical requirements and timing, with an Australian effective date of 8 August 2002.  The Boeing service bulletin mentioned (Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 737-27-1223, 21 October 1999) is listed as a related document.\n\n**Which aircraft and people are affected\n\n- Affects all Boeing 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400 and -500 series aeroplanes operating in Australia.  The primary actors who must act are the aircraft operators/maintenance organisations that maintain those aeroplanes.  CASA (through its delegate) enforces the directive.\n\n**Why it matters (the safety issue and the mechanical cause)\n\n- During repair work, a broken aileron tab control rod barrel was discovered.  The investigation found an incorrectly located internal thread relief groove in manufacture, producing an extremely thin barrel wall.  If a tab control rod barrel fails, the aileron tab could disconnect and cause severe airframe vibration, damage to the wing and control surfaces, and possible loss of control of the aircraft.\n\n**How it works in practice\n\n- The AD does not itself set out the inspection/repair steps in detail.  Instead it makes compliance with FAA AD 2002-10-12 mandatory for the listed aircraft in Australia.  Operators must follow the inspections, replacements or repairs and the compliance times specified in that FAA AD (and the Boeing service information it references).  Compliance must be done at the times stated in the FAA AD; the Australian instrument's only substantive change is to set the Australian effective date (8 August 2002).\n\n**Who pays, who decides, and what behaviour changes\n\n- Who pays: aircraft operators or their maintenance providers pay for the inspections, any parts and labour, and for any aircraft downtime.  If replacement parts are required, operators may face lead times and parts costs.\n- Who decides: CASA (through its delegate) issued the AD and enforces compliance; the technical steps and acceptable methods are those set out in the FAA AD and Boeing service bulletin.\n- Behaviour changes: operators must schedule and carry out the specified inspections/repairs on affected aircraft and document compliance.  Failure to comply could render the aircraft unairworthy.\n\n**Trade-offs, implementation risks and compliance burden\n\n- Trade-offs: the directive prioritises safety by imposing inspections/repairs; the immediate cost is operator time, maintenance resources and potential temporary aircraft grounding.  The benefit is reduced risk of catastrophic control-surface failure.\n- Implementation risks: reliance on FAA/Boeing documents means operators must obtain and follow those external documents; any ambiguity or parts shortages in those documents could delay compliance.  If inspections find defects, aircraft may be grounded pending repair, increasing operational cost.\n- Compliance burden: the AD applies to a defined set of aircraft only.  The burden is concentrated on operators of the affected 737 series; there are no broad or ongoing regulatory programmes introduced beyond the one-off or repeated actions specified by the FAA AD.\n\n**Where to find the technical steps\n\n- The mandatory technical instructions and compliance times are contained in FAA AD 2002-10-12 and the Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 737-27-1223 (referenced).  This Australian AD directs operators to follow those documents.\n\n(Sections cited: Applicability; Requirement; Compliance; Background.)"}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-b737-186-aileron-tab-control-rod-barrel","history":"/api/acts/ad-b737-186-aileron-tab-control-rod-barrel/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-b737-186-aileron-tab-control-rod-barrel/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-b737-186-aileron-tab-control-rod-barrel/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-b737-186-aileron-tab-control-rod-barrel/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-b737-186-aileron-tab-control-rod-barrel/documents"}}