{"id":"F2006B02822","name":"AD/B737/120 - Rudder Pedal Pushrods","slug":"ad-b737-120-rudder-pedal-pushrods","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":42164,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B02822-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"AD/B737/120 - Rudder Pedal Pushrods","content":"COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nBoeing 737 Series Aeroplanes\n\nAD/B737/120 Rudder Pedal Pushrods 10/98\n\nApplicability: Model 737 series aircraft; as listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-27A1212, dated March 26, 1998.\n\nRequirement: Perform a one-time inspection to detect discrepancies of the fasteners that connect the forward ends of the pushrods to the rudder pedal assemblies, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-27A1212.\n\nNote: FAA AD 98-13-12 Amdt 39-10600 refers.\n\nCompliance: Unless already accomplished, before 10 November 1998.\n\nThis airworthiness directive becomes effective on 10 September 1998.\n\nBackground: The FAA received a report from an operator indicating that, on a Model 737-400 series aircraft, during rollout after landing, the captain’s right rudder pedal moved to the full travel position when it was pushed. The pedal failed to return to its normal position after it was released even though the rudder remained in the neutral position. Investigation revealed that the forward end of the pushrod on the right rudder pedal was not connected to the rudder pedal assembly. The nut and washer of the pushrod were found in the lower forward compartment. The cause of the missing hardware has been attributed to incorrect installation during manufacture.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The directive stays within the original safety-remedial scope: it mandates a one-time inspection to detect missing or incorrectly installed fastener hardware on rudder pedal pushrods for the models listed in the Boeing service bulletin, consistent with the FAA report and referenced FAA AD. There is no expansion of affected systems, actions, or affected operator classes beyond that described."},"complexity_factors":["Reference to an external technical document (Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-27A1212) — compliance requires following that bulletin’s procedures","Applicability limited to specific 737 models listed in the service bulletin — operators must confirm model/listing applicability","One-time inspection with a fixed compliance deadline (operational scheduling and resource allocation required)","Cross-reference to FAA AD 98-13-12 — coordination/consistency with another regulator’s directive","Technical nature of inspection (access to pushrod/fastener areas, mechanical/maintenance expertise required)","Cause traced to manufacturing/installation error — may require tracking parts or repair if discrepancies found"],"plain_english_summary":"This directive requires operators of the Boeing 737 models listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-27A1212 to carry out a one-time inspection of the fasteners that join the forward ends of the rudder pedal pushrods to the rudder pedal assemblies. It is intended to find incorrectly installed or missing nuts/washers (reported by the FAA). Aircraft operators must arrange and pay for the inspection; the Civil Aviation Safety Authority enforces the compliance deadline (due 10 November 1998; effective 10 September 1998)."},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This is a discrete, targeted safety directive addressing a specific mechanical defect in a specific aircraft type. It has not expanded beyond its original purpose of mandating inspection of rudder pedal pushrod fasteners."},"complexity_factors":["Very short document (approximately 200 words)","Only 1 defined term implicitly referenced (the Boeing Service Bulletin)","Single, unambiguous compliance requirement (one-time inspection)","No nested exceptions or conditional logic","Clear, fixed compliance deadline","Straightforward applicability criteria referencing a single external document"],"plain_english_summary":"This CASA Airworthiness Directive orders operators of specified Boeing 737s to inspect the rudder pedal pushrod forward-end fasteners (nuts, bolts, washers) per the referenced Boeing service bulletin. It follows an incident where a captain’s rudder pedal detached during landing due to missing/incorrectly installed hardware, risking loss of directional control. Compliance was required by 10 November 1998."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-b737-120-rudder-pedal-pushrods","history":"/api/acts/ad-b737-120-rudder-pedal-pushrods/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-b737-120-rudder-pedal-pushrods/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-b737-120-rudder-pedal-pushrods/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-b737-120-rudder-pedal-pushrods/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-b737-120-rudder-pedal-pushrods/documents"}}