{"id":"F2006B02619","name":"AD/B717/6 - Spoiler Actuator Shut-Off Valve","slug":"ad-b717-6-spoiler-actuator-shut-off-valve","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":41935,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B02619-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE","sectionType":"part","heading":"AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE","content":"# ![](image.001.png)  \nAIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE\n\nFor the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.\n\n![](image.001.png)\n\nBoeing 717 Series Aeroplanes","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"AD/B717/6 Spoiler Actuator Shut-Off Valv","sectionType":"part","heading":"AD/B717/6 Spoiler Actuator Shut-Off Valve 10/2002","content":"# AD/B717/6 Spoiler Actuator Shut-Off Valve 10/2002\n\nApplicability: All model 717-200 series aeroplanes.\n\nRequirement: 1. Determine the electrical resistance within the solenoid of the inboard and outboard spoiler actuator assemblies by carrying out either a spoiler actuator return-to-service (RTS) test or a spoiler system RTS test, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 717- 27A0025 dated 11 June 2002.\n\n2. If any failure is noted during any Requirement 1 test, perform applicable corrective actions (including replacing the spoiler actuator assembly with a new spoiler actuator assembly and correcting all faults in the centralized fault display system), in accordance with ASB 717-27A0025, repeating the test until a successful complete RTS test has been achieved.\n\nNote: FAA AD 2002-16-09 Amdt 39-12848 refers.\n\nCompliance: For Requirement 1 \\- Within 60 days after the effective date of this Directive and thereafter at intervals of no more that 550 hours time in service.\n\nFor Requirement 2 \\- Before further flight after the Requirement 1 test. This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 3 October 2002.\n\nBackground: The United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has recently been advised of failed tests of spoiler actuator assemblies due to failure of the solenoid-operated shut-off valve (SOV) on model 717-200 aeroplanes, both in service and during final assembly. Analysis by the manufacturer indicates that these solenoids contain high electrical resistance, which can be detected only during spoiler RTS tests. The presence of high electrical resistance in the solenoid is considered a latent failure and the cause of the high resistance is under investigation. The combined failure of the solenoid-operated SOV and the spoiler actuator will cause a single spoiler panel hardover, which could result in reduced controllability of the aeroplane.","sortOrder":1}],"analysis":{"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This Airworthiness Directive maintains its original narrow scope — addressing a specific identified safety defect in spoiler actuator solenoids on Boeing 717-200 aircraft. The requirements remain tightly focused on testing and replacing faulty components, with no expansion into unrelated systems or aircraft types."},"complexity_factors":["Single specific technical requirement with clear alternative testing methods (spoiler actuator RTS test OR spoiler system RTS test)","Only 2 main requirements with straightforward conditional logic (if test fails, then repair)","Minimal cross-referencing — only refers to one Boeing Alert Service Bulletin and one FAA AD for context","No defined terms section — technical terms (solenoid, RTS, SOV) are industry standard or explained in context","Clear compliance timeline with specific numerical thresholds (60 days, 550 hours)","Single applicability criterion (all 717-200 series)"],"plain_english_summary":"This safety order requires operators of Boeing 717-200s in Australia to inspect and test the electrical resistance of spoiler-actuator solenoids and repair or replace faulty actuators and related systems. It targets airline operators and maintenance crews because solenoid/actuator failures can cause uncontrollable spoiler movement (\"hardover\"), degrading pilot control and creating a serious safety hazard."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This directive stays within the original purpose of detecting and remedying high electrical resistance in the spoiler actuator solenoid‑operated shut‑off valve on Boeing 717‑200 aeroplanes. It does not broaden applicability beyond that aircraft model or add unrelated requirements. The measures (specified test, repeat interval, and corrective action before further flight) are consistent with addressing the stated unsafe condition."},"complexity_factors":["Short, single‑topic instrument (one aircraft type, one failure mode)","Clear applicability: only Boeing 717‑200 series","Two substantive requirements (test + corrective action) with simple pass/fail logic","Two timing conditions: initial within 60 days, recurring every 550 flight hours","Cross‑references to one Boeing Alert Service Bulletin (ASB 717‑27A0025) and one FAA AD (2002‑16‑09) — limited external linkage","No layered exceptions or many defined terms; no complex conditional branches beyond repeat‑until‑pass"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this directive does (mechanics)\n\n- Who it applies to: All Boeing 717‑200 aeroplanes (Applicability).\n\n- What operators must do: Check the electrical resistance in the solenoid of each inboard and outboard spoiler actuator by performing either a \"spoiler actuator return‑to‑service (RTS) test\" or a \"spoiler system RTS test\" following Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 717‑27A0025 dated 11 June 2002 (Requirement 1). If a test shows a failure, operators must carry out the corrective actions listed in that Boeing service bulletin — this can include replacing the spoiler actuator assembly and fixing any related faults shown by the centralised fault display system — and repeat the test until it passes (Requirement 2).\n\n- When it must be done: The first test must be done within 60 days of the directive becoming effective and thereafter at intervals of no more than 550 flight hours. Any required corrective action must be completed before the aircraft is allowed to fly again (Compliance).\n\n- Why it was issued (stated reason): The FAA found spoiler actuator assembly tests failing because the solenoid‑operated shut‑off valve (SOV) can have high electrical resistance that is only detectable during the RTS test. That latent failure, together with a spoiler actuator failure, could cause a single spoiler panel to go hardover (stick in one position), which could reduce the aircraft's controllability (Background). The AD references FAA AD 2002‑16‑09 for related action.\n\nPurpose claims and practical effects\n\n- The stated purpose is to detect and correct high resistance in the SOV solenoids before it combines with another actuator fault and produces a single‑panel spoiler hardover (Applicability; Background; Requirement 1–2). That purpose is implemented by mandating a specific diagnostic test, repeating it on a fixed interval, and requiring corrective action prior to flight if the test fails (Requirement 1–2; Compliance).\n\nCosts, incentives and trade‑offs\n\n- Who pays: Aircraft operators bear the cost of performing the tests, any troubleshooting, parts replacement (spoiler actuator assemblies) and the labour and aircraft downtime required to carry out repairs and repeat tests (Requirement 1–2; Compliance).\n\n- Incentives created: Operators are incentivised to run the specified RTS tests at the required intervals and to replace suspect assemblies quickly to return the aircraft to service. Maintenance organisations and parts suppliers will experience increased workload and potential sales from replacements.\n\n- Opportunity costs and scheduling: Required checks within 60 days and then every 550 flight hours will affect maintenance scheduling. If failures occur, aircraft may be grounded until corrective action is completed (Requirement 2; Compliance).\n\nImplementation risks and compliance burden\n\n- Detection and technical risk: The defect is described as latent and detectable only by the RTS test. That makes the mandated test an appropriate detection mechanism but increases reliance on the specific test procedure in the Boeing service bulletin (Background; Requirement 1).\n\n- Parts availability and repair time: If replacement spoiler actuator assemblies are required, supply constraints or long lead times could increase aircraft downtime and operational disruption (Requirement 2).\n\n- Administrative burden: Operators must track compliance intervals (60 days initially; then 550 flight hours) and keep records of tests and corrective actions; regulators may inspect compliance (Compliance).\n\nEffects on private choice and competition\n\n- Maintenance and aftermarket markets: Independent MROs (maintenance, repair and overhaul providers) and parts suppliers will capture the maintenance work and parts demand created by the AD. Larger operators with in‑house maintenance may absorb the work internally; smaller operators may outsource.\n\n- No change to operational permissions: The AD mandates testing and fixes but does not change who can operate the aeroplane or the underlying airworthiness standards. It requires remedial action before further flight if a failure is found (Requirement 2; Compliance).\n\nSummary statement\n\nThis Airworthiness Directive requires Boeing 717‑200 operators to run a specific electrical resistance test on spoiler actuator solenoids at short, defined intervals and to fix or replace faulty assemblies before further flight. The measure is targeted at detecting a latent high‑resistance failure in the solenoid‑operated shut‑off valve that, if combined with another failure, can produce a spoiler hardover. The direct costs fall on operators (test time, maintenance labour, parts, and potential aircraft downtime); the safety benefit is detection and removal of a latent hardware defect. The AD enforces compliance by prescribing the test method (per Boeing ASB 717‑27A0025), timing (initial within 60 days, then every 550 flight hours) and mandatory corrective action before flight (Requirement 1–2; Compliance; Background)."},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"A positive credit balance is required for all requests, including BYOK, so fallback providers remain available. Add credits at https://vercel.com/d?to=%2F%5Bteam%5D%2F%7E%2Fai%3Fmodal%3Dtop-up to continue.","source":"analysis-cron"}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-b717-6-spoiler-actuator-shut-off-valve","history":"/api/acts/ad-b717-6-spoiler-actuator-shut-off-valve/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-b717-6-spoiler-actuator-shut-off-valve/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-b717-6-spoiler-actuator-shut-off-valve/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-b717-6-spoiler-actuator-shut-off-valve/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-b717-6-spoiler-actuator-shut-off-valve/documents"}}