{"id":"F2008L03974","name":"AD/B717/31 - Elevator Standby Cable","slug":"ad-b717-31-elevator-standby-cable","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":75748,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2008L03974-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-02","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"Boeing 717 Series Aeroplanes","sectionType":"division","heading":"Boeing 717 Series Aeroplanes","content":"### Boeing 717 Series Aeroplanes\n\n| AD/B717/31 | Elevator Standby Cable | 12/2008 |\n| ---------- | ---------------------- | ------- |\n\n| Applicability: | McDonnell Douglas Model 717-200 aeroplanes, as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 717-27A0039, dated 6 December 2007.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |\n| -------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Requirement:   | 1. For all aeroplanes: Do a general visual inspection of the drive assembly of the aft elevator standby loop of the elevator standby cable system for interference between the clevis and bolt of the bellcrank assembly, correct orientation of the pull-pull cable clevis bolt, and excessive freeplay of the bellcrank assembly bearing. Do all applicable corrective actions before further flight.2. For aeroplanes identified in the service bulletin as Group 1, Configuration 1: Modify the pull-pull cable clevis in the drive assembly of the aft elevator standby loop of the elevator standby cable system.Do the applicable actions specified in Requirements 1 and 2 of this AD in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 717-27A0039 dated 6 December 2007.Later revisions of the above ASB, approved by the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as an Alternate Method of Compliance (AMOC) to FAA AD 2008-18-05 are considered acceptable for compliance with the equivalent Requirements of this AD.Note: FAA AD 2008-18-05 Amdt 39-15662 dated 18 August 2008 refers. |\n| Compliance:    | For Requirement 1 - Within 3,000 flight hours or 27 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later.For Requirement 2 - At the applicable time specified in paragraph 1.E., ''Compliance,'' of the service bulletin; except, where the service bulletin specifies a compliance time after the date on the service bulletin, this AD requires compliance within the specified compliance time after the effective date of this AD.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |\n|                | This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 20 November 2008.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |\n\n| Background: | This AD results from a report of an aborted takeoff due to a control column disconnect. The issuing of this AD is intended to prevent binding of the bolt that connects the cable 264A clevis to the bellcrank assembly against the adjacent (upper) clevis of the pull-pull cable assembly. This binding condition could result in slow airplane rotation or a control column disconnect during takeoff and a runway excursion if takeoff must be aborted. |\n| ----------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nCharles Lenarcic  \nDelegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority\n\n22 September 2008","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"AD/B717/31","sectionType":"part","heading":"AD/B717/31","content":"## AD/B717/31","sortOrder":1},{"sectionNumber":"Elevator Standby Cable","sectionType":"part","heading":"Elevator Standby Cable","content":"## Elevator Standby Cable","sortOrder":2},{"sectionNumber":"12/2008","sectionType":"part","heading":"12/2008","content":"## 12/2008","sortOrder":3}],"analysis":{"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This AD maintains its original narrow scope — addressing a specific mechanical defect in the elevator standby cable system of Boeing 717-200 aircraft. It has not expanded beyond this original safety purpose."},"complexity_factors":["Short, single-purpose instrument focused on one mechanical system","Only 2 main requirements with clear applicability distinctions (all aircraft vs specific group)","Single cross-reference to Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 717-27A0039 for technical procedures","Simple conditional compliance structure (whichever occurs later)","Limited defined terms — relies on external Boeing documentation for technical specifications","No nested exceptions or complex logical operators"],"plain_english_summary":"This CASA Airworthiness Directive mandates inspections and corrective action on the elevator standby cable drive assembly of certain Boeing 717‑200 aeroplanes to stop a bolt from binding or contacting the clevis. Owners/operators must inspect for interference, bolt orientation and bearing freeplay and repair defects before flight; a subset of aircraft also require a clevis modification per Boeing’s service bulletin. Inspections are due within 3,000 flight hours or 27 months."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The AD remains tightly focused on the original technical problem described in the background: preventing binding of the clevis/bolt in the aft elevator standby loop that could lead to control column disconnect or slow airplane rotation. It does not broaden regulatory reach beyond inspection and, where applicable, modification of the listed parts and does not add unrelated obligations. Therefore the scope has not changed significantly beyond the original safety objective."},"complexity_factors":["Short, focused AD (single system: elevator standby cable).","Two substantive requirements: Requirement 1 (inspection + corrective action) and Requirement 2 (modification) with group/configuration conditionality.","Cross-reference to external Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 717-27A0039 (dated 6 Dec 2007).","Acceptance of later revisions only if approved by the FAA as an AMOC (cross-jurisdictional delegation).","Compliance timing uses a ‘whichever later’ rule (3,000 flight hours or 27 months) which requires operators to calculate both metrics.","Corrective actions are not fully specified within the AD and rely on the service bulletin and maintenance judgement (adds interpretive discretion).","Potential immediate grounding requirement if corrective action is necessary (“before further flight”) increases operational impact uncertainty."],"plain_english_summary":"**What this instrument does (mechanically)**\n\n- Requires operators of McDonnell Douglas/Boeing 717-200 aeroplanes (those listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 717-27A0039, dated 6 December 2007) to inspect and, in some cases, modify part of the elevator standby cable system.\n- Specifically, it mandates a general visual inspection of the drive assembly on the aft elevator standby loop to check for:\n  - interference between the clevis and bolt of the bellcrank assembly;\n  - correct orientation of the pull-pull cable clevis bolt; and\n  - excessive freeplay (looseness) of the bellcrank assembly bearing. (This is Requirement 1.)\n- If an aircraft is listed as Group 1, Configuration 1 in the Boeing service bulletin, the AD additionally requires modification of the pull-pull cable clevis in that drive assembly. (This is Requirement 2.)\n- Any corrective actions discovered by the inspection must be completed before the aircraft is returned to service (i.e. before further flight).\n- The AD requires compliance with the Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 717-27A0039 dated 6 December 2007 and accepts later revisions of that service bulletin if they have been approved by the United States FAA as an Alternative Method of Compliance (AMOC).\n\n**Who this affects**\n\n- Aircraft owners and operators of McDonnell Douglas/Boeing 717-200 aeroplanes as identified in the referenced Boeing service bulletin.\n- Maintenance organisations and engineers who perform inspections and modifications on the elevator standby cable system.\n- The regulator (Civil Aviation Safety Authority) enforces the requirement; operators are responsible for compliance.\n\n**Timing and enforcement**\n\n- The inspection (Requirement 1) must be done within 3,000 flight hours or 27 months after the AD’s effective date, whichever is later.\n- The modification for Group 1, Configuration 1 aeroplanes (Requirement 2) must be done within the time specified in paragraph 1.E., \"Compliance,\" of the Boeing service bulletin; if that time in the service bulletin is measured from the service bulletin date rather than the AD effective date, the AD requires compliance within the same interval measured from the AD effective date.\n- If the inspection finds problems, corrective work must be done before further flight, which may require grounding the aircraft until fixed.\n\n**Why it matters (stated purpose and mechanical effect)**\n\n- The AD was issued after a reported aborted takeoff caused by a control column disconnect. The stated purpose is to prevent binding of the bolt that connects cable 264A clevis to the bellcrank assembly against an adjacent clevis in the pull-pull cable assembly.\n- The mechanical failure being avoided is bolt binding that could cause slow rotation during takeoff or a control column disconnect. Either outcome could lead to a runway excursion if a takeoff is aborted.\n\n**Costs, incentives, trade-offs, and implementation issues**\n\n- Who pays: operators/owners pay for the inspection time, any corrective actions or parts, and the opportunity cost of scheduling downtime for the aircraft.\n- Compliance burden: a mandatory visual inspection for the fleet items listed, plus a modification for a specific subgroup (Group 1, Configuration 1). The AD leaves corrective action content to the service bulletin and the repair organisation, creating some discretion for maintenance providers.\n- Delegation and cross-jurisdictional reliance: the AD requires compliance with Boeing’s service bulletin and accepts later FAA-approved revisions as AMOCs. That delegates some technical judgment to Boeing and the FAA for acceptable repair procedures.\n- Implementation risks: if the inspection reveals defects requiring immediate repair, aircraft will be out of service until fixed. If operators defer or incorrectly perform inspections, the safety risk the AD targets remains.\n- Concentration of costs and benefits: costs (inspection, parts, downtime) are concentrated on aircraft owners/operators; the safety benefit (reduced risk of a control column disconnect/slow rotation) accrues to passengers, crew, and public safety broadly.\n- Substitution and scheduling: operators can schedule the inspection/modification during other maintenance checks to reduce operational disruption, but must meet the AD’s timing window.\n\n**Key source references in the instrument**\n\n- Applicability: Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 717-27A0039, dated 6 December 2007.\n- Requirement 1 (inspection and corrective action before further flight).\n- Requirement 2 (modification for Group 1, Configuration 1).\n- Compliance timing: 3,000 flight hours or 27 months for Requirement 1; service-bulletin-specified timing for Requirement 2 (adjusted to the AD’s effective date where necessary).\n- Background: issued following a reported aborted takeoff due to a control column disconnect.\n"},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"Unauthenticated. Configure AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY or use a provider module. Learn more: https://ai-sdk.dev/unauthenticated-ai-gateway","source":"analysis-cron"}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-b717-31-elevator-standby-cable","history":"/api/acts/ad-b717-31-elevator-standby-cable/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-b717-31-elevator-standby-cable/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-b717-31-elevator-standby-cable/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-b717-31-elevator-standby-cable/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-b717-31-elevator-standby-cable/documents"}}