{"id":"F2007L01362","name":"AD/A330/23 Amdt 2 - Elevator Servo Control Transducer Attachment lug Inspection and FCOM Amendment","slug":"ad-a330-23-amdt-2-elevator-servo-control-transducer-attachment-lug-inspection-and-fcom-amendment","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":65649,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2007L01362-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-02","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes","sectionType":"division","heading":"Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes","content":"### Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes\n\n| AD/A330/23 Amdt 2 | Elevator Servo Control Transducer Attachment lug Inspection and FCOM Amendment | 6/2007 |\n| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------ |\n\n| Applicability: | AIRBUS aircraft A330-200 and A330-300, series, all certified models and all serial numbers except those on which AIRBUS modification 50394 or 52195 or 53969 or 54833 has been embodied in production or AIRBUS Service Bulletin (SB)A330-27-3128 or Goodrich VSB 4800-27-16 Revision 03 or SB A330-27-3136 has been embodied in service.Reminder: It is the responsibility of the operator to ensure that any spare part that has been installed on the aircraft after delivery does not invalidate the compliance of the aircraft with the requirements of this Airworthiness Directive (AD).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |\n| -------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Requirement:   | 1. Operational proceduresAmend the current flight control check procedures as follows for one or both damping servo controls that have accumulated more than 1,000 flight cycles (FC) since new:PRIOR OR DURING TAXI :FLIGHT CONTROLS ....................................CHECK“1. AT A CONVENIENT STAGE, PRIOR TO OR DURING TAXI, ANDBEFORE ARMING THE AUTOBRAKE, THE PF SILENTLY APPLIESFULL LONGITUDINAL AND LATERAL SIDESTICK DEFLECTION.ON THE F/CTL PAGE, THE PNF CHECKS FULL TRAVEL OF ALLELEVATORS AND ALL AILERONS, AND THE CORRECTDEFLECTION AND RETRACTION OF ALL SPOILERS. THE PNFCALLS OUT \"FULL UP\", \"FULL DOWN\", \"NEUTRAL\", \"FULL LEFT\",\"FULL RIGHT\", \"NEUTRAL\", AS EACH FULL TRAVEL/NEUTRALPOSITION IS REACHED.THE PF SILENTLY CHECKS THAT THE PNF CALLS ARE INACCORDANCE WITH THE SIDESTICK ORDER.NOTE: IN ORDER TO REACH FULL TRAVEL, FULL SIDESTICKMUST BE HELD FOR A SUFFICIENT PERIOD OF TIME. |\n\n|     | 2. THE PF PRESSES THE PEDAL DISC PUSHBUTTON ON THENOSEWHEEL TILLER, AND SILENTLY APPLIES FULL LEFTRUDDER, FULL RIGHT RUDDER, AND NEUTRAL. THE PNFCALLS OUT \"FULL LEFT\", \"FULL RIGHT\", \"NEUTRAL\", AS EACHFULL TRAVEL/NEUTRAL POSITION IS REACHED.3. THE PNF APPLIES FULL LONGITUDINAL AND LATERALSIDESTICK DEFLECTION, AND SILENTLY CHECKS FULL TRAVELAND CORRECT SENSE OF ALL ELEVATORS AND ALLAILERONS, AND CORRECT DEFLECTION AND RETRACTION OFALL SPOILERS, ON THE ECAM F/CTL PAGE.”Note 1: The task sharing between the PF and the PNF for the above flight control checks can be amended by each operator depending on its operational policy and local airworthiness requirements.Note 2: The above listed procedure is included in A330 FCOM Vol.3 Rev.19 / Standard Operating Procedures 3.03.10 p3 can be used to amend the flight control check procedure:2. Inspection of each elevator servo control in damping position 3CS1 and 3CS2a. Perform a dye penetrant inspection of the mode selector valve position transducer attachment lugs in accordance with the instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) A330-27A3115 Rev 02.b. Repeat the inspection in Requirement 2a. of this AD.Note 3: Requirement 1 of this AD is no longer required once both damping servo controls are repetitively inspected as required by Requirement 2b. However, it is recommended to follow flight control check as procedure given in § 1. which has been introduced in FCOM documentation.3. In case of any crack finding, replace the transducer by a spare one or replace the elevator servo control in accordance with the instructions of Airbus SBA330-27A3115 Rev 02.4. Inspection of spare transducer or elevator servo controlDo not install a spare transducer or a transducer fitted on a spare elevator servo control as replacement part on an aircraft, unless it has been inspected in accordance with the instructions of Airbus SB A330 27A3115 Rev 02. |\n| --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n\n|             | 5. Elevator servo-controls PN SC4800-7A and PN SC4800-9Modify the four elevator servo-controls in accordance with instructions defined in Airbus SB A330-27-3128. Mode valve transducer MVT100 removed from servo-controls as required by this Requirement must be discarded.6. Elevator servo-controls PN SC4800-10 and PN SC4800-11Identify the serial number (SN) of elevator servo controls Part Number (PN) SC4800-10 and SC4800-11.If SN is 2324 or below, modify the elevator servo controls (active and damping) of both elevators (LH and RH) in accordance with instructions of Goodrich VSB 4800-27-16 Rev.03. Mode valve transducer MVT100 removed from servo-controls as required by this Requirement must be discarded.The installation of the new reinforced mode valve transducer (MVT200) in the elevator servo controls as listed in Requirements 5 and/or 6 cancels the repetitive inspections required by this AD.Later approved revisions of the referenced documents may be used in lieu of those listed in this AD.Note 4: EASA AD 2007-0011 dated 9 January 2007 refers. This AD supersedes DGAC AD F-2003-460. |\n| ----------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Compliance: | 1. Remains unchanged as 18 March 2004 (the effective date of Amendment 1 of this AD).2. a. For each elevator servo control not yet dye penetrant inspected per Airbus All Operator Telex (AOT) A330-27A3115 Rev 01, prior to the accumulation of 1,000 FC since new or within 350 FC after 18 March 2004 the effective date of Amendment 1 of this AD, whichever occurs later.For each elevator servo control already dye penetrant inspected as per Airbus AOT A330-27A3115 Rev 01, prior to the accumulation of 700 FC since the last dye penetrant inspection or prior to the accumulation of 1,350 FC since new, whichever occurs later.2. b. At intervals not exceeding 350 FC.3. Before further flight after the effective date of this AD.4. From the effective date of this AD.5. Unless already accomplished, not later than 30 June 2008.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |\n\n|             | 6. Unless already accomplished, not later than 30 June 2008.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |\n| ----------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n|             | This Amendment becomes effective on 7 June 2007.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |\n| Background: | Two cases have been reported of the elevator dropping to the full down position, without ECAM warning, while the flight crew was carrying out pre-flight controls check. This occurred after hydraulic power-up and prior to engine start. The cause has been identified as cracking of the elevator servo control mode selector valve position transducer body attachment lugs. This resulted in displacement of the transducer, external hydraulic fluid leakage and subsequent loss of the corresponding hydraulic circuit.Amendment 1 of this AD introduced repetitive inspection of the transducer attachment and simplified the flight control check procedures.Amendment 2 mandates the replacement of the Mode Valve Transducer and excludes from the applicability aircraft fitted with P/N SC4800-113 or SC4800-114 or SC4800-xx4 servo controls.The original issue of this Directive became effective on 1 October 2003 and was based on DGAC Emergency AD U2003-371(B).Amendment 1 of this AD became effective on 18 March 2004. |\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nDavid Punshon  \nDelegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority\n\n24 April 2007","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"AD/A330/23 Amdt 2","sectionType":"part","heading":"AD/A330/23 Amdt 2","content":"## AD/A330/23 Amdt 2","sortOrder":1},{"sectionNumber":"Elevator Servo Control Transducer Attach","sectionType":"part","heading":"Elevator Servo Control Transducer Attachment lug Inspection and FCOM Amendment","content":"## Elevator Servo Control Transducer Attachment lug Inspection and FCOM Amendment","sortOrder":2},{"sectionNumber":"6/2007","sectionType":"part","heading":"6/2007","content":"## 6/2007","sortOrder":3}],"analysis":{"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":6,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The original directive (October 2003) was an emergency response requiring immediate inspections. Amendment 1 (March 2004) added repetitive inspections and operational workarounds. Amendment 2 (June 2007) significantly expanded the scope by mandating permanent hardware modifications (replacement of Mode Valve Transducers with reinforced MVT200 units) and adding complex part number/serial number differentiation. The directive evolved from a temporary safety measure to a comprehensive retrofit program with a hard deadline (30 June 2008), while also narrowing applicability through additional exemptions."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple interdependent requirements (1-6) with cross-references between them","Complex applicability exclusions involving 4 production modifications and 3 service bulletins","Nested timing conditions for compliance (e.g., 'prior to accumulation of 1,000 FC since new or within 350 FC after 18 March 2004, whichever occurs later')","Requirement dependencies (e.g., Requirement 1 becomes unnecessary once Requirement 2b is satisfied, but only if combined with Requirements 5 or 6)","Multiple part numbers (PN) and serial number (SN) thresholds requiring different actions (SC4800-7A/9A vs SC4800-10/11 with SN cut-off at 2324)","Reference to external technical documents (Airbus SBs, Goodrich VSB, FCOM revisions) that are not reproduced in the AD","Amendment history tracking (original issue, Amendment 1, Amendment 2) with different effective dates and superseded directives"],"plain_english_summary":"This mandatory CASA Airworthiness Directive targets Airbus A330‑200/300 aircraft after two incidents where a cracked elevator servo control transducer caused hydraulic fluid loss and sudden, unannounced full‑down elevator movement. It requires enhanced pre‑flight elevator checks, repetitive dye‑penetrant inspections of the transducer attachment lugs, replacement of cracked units (and inspection before installing spares), and a mandatory hardware modification or replacement by 30 June 2008 to eliminate the recurring inspection requirements."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":6,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"Amendment 2 expands and alters the original AD by moving beyond repetitive inspections to mandate replacement/retrofit of the mode valve transducer (MVT100 → MVT200) for specified servo controls, excluding aircraft already fitted with certain servo control P/Ns, and providing that installation of the reinforced transducer cancels the repetitive inspection requirement. It therefore shifts the remedy from inspection‑led mitigation to mandatory modification for defined serial‑number and part‑number ranges (Background; Requirements 5–6; Note 3)."},"complexity_factors":["Conditional applicability with multiple production modifications and service bulletin exceptions (Applicability).","Several interlocking requirements: procedural amendment, repetitive inspections, replacement/repair, and spare‑part inspection/installation ban (Requirements 1–4).","Multiple compliance thresholds tied to flight cycles since new or since last inspection, and different intervals depending on prior actions (Compliance 2a/2b).","Part‑number and serial‑number dependent retrofit obligation (Requirements 5–6: PN SC4800‑7A/‑9 and PN SC4800‑10/‑11 with SN ≤2324).","Dependence on external service documents (Airbus SB A330‑27A3115 Rev 02, SB A330‑27‑3128, Goodrich VSB 4800‑27‑16 Rev.03) and allowance for later approved revisions.","Mandatory discard of removed MVT100 and cancellation of repetitive inspections once MVT200 installed (Requirements 5–6, Note 3) creates tracking and parts‑management burdens.","Operational/procedural change (FCOM amendment) with limited operator flexibility on task sharing but new mandatory check wording (Requirement 1, Notes).","Staged compliance dates and retroactive deadlines (Compliance and Compliance dates) increase planning complexity for operators."],"plain_english_summary":"Requires Airbus A330-200/300 operators to amend flight‑control check procedures, perform repetitive dye‑penetrant inspections of the elevator servo control mode‑selector valve transducer attachment lugs, and to replace or modify affected elevator servo‑controls (discarding the MVT100) with a reinforced transducer (MVT200) per Airbus/Goodrich service instructions. It also prevents fitting uninspected spare transducers.\n\nThis affects aircraft operators and maintenance organisations, who pay for inspections, part replacements and record checks. The measures respond to reported elevator drops traced to cracked transducer attachment lugs and set mandatory inspection, modification and serial‑number rules."},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"A positive credit balance is required for all requests, including BYOK, so fallback providers remain available. Add credits at https://vercel.com/d?to=%2F%5Bteam%5D%2F%7E%2Fai%3Fmodal%3Dtop-up to continue.","source":"analysis-cron"}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-a330-23-amdt-2-elevator-servo-control-transducer-attachment-lug-inspection-and-fcom-amendment","history":"/api/acts/ad-a330-23-amdt-2-elevator-servo-control-transducer-attachment-lug-inspection-and-fcom-amendment/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-a330-23-amdt-2-elevator-servo-control-transducer-attachment-lug-inspection-and-fcom-amendment/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-a330-23-amdt-2-elevator-servo-control-transducer-attachment-lug-inspection-and-fcom-amendment/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-a330-23-amdt-2-elevator-servo-control-transducer-attachment-lug-inspection-and-fcom-amendment/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-a330-23-amdt-2-elevator-servo-control-transducer-attachment-lug-inspection-and-fcom-amendment/documents"}}