{"id":"F2006B01998","name":"AD/A330/19 - Thrust Reverser - Directional Pilot Valve Pressure Test/Replacement","slug":"ad-a330-19-thrust-reverser-directional-pilot-valve-pressure-test-replacement","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":41220,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B01998-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes","sectionType":"part","heading":"Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes","content":"# Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes\n\nAD/A330/19 (continued)","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"Definition of a Serviceable DPV Assembly","sectionType":"part","heading":"Definition of a Serviceable DPV Assembly","content":"# Definition of a Serviceable DPV Assembly\n\nFor the purpose of this Directive, a serviceable DPV assembly is an assembly that has either accumulated zero time-since-new (TSN), or has accumulated zero time- in- service (TIS) after having passed the tests contained in the Middle River Aircraft Systems Component Maintenance Manual GEK 85007 (78-31-51), Directional Pilot Solenoid Valve, Page Block 101, Testing and Trouble Shooting, or equivalent approved maintenance date, or has been successfully leak tested in accordance with paragraph 2.B. of the Accomplishment Instructions of Middle River Aircraft Systems ASB 78A5053 dated 30 October 2001.\n\nNote: FAA AD 2002-06-07 Amdt 39-12684 refers.\n\nCompliance: For Requirement 1, 1(a)&(b) or 2: Prior to exceeding 7,000 flight hours’ time-since- new (TSN) or 1,000 flight hours’ time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date of this Directive.\n\nFor Requirement 3, excluding 3(a)&(b): Prior to exceeding 7,000 flight hours’ time- since-new (TSN) or 1,000 flight hours’ time- in-service (TIS) after the effective date of this Directive.\n\nFor Requirement 3(a): Prior to further flight after deactivation of the thrust reverser in accordance with Requirement 3.\n\nFor Requirement 3(b): Within 10 days after deactivation of the thrust reverser in accordance with Requirement 3.\n\nFor Requirement 4: At intervals of not exceeding 7,000 flight hours since the last check or replacement of the DPV assembly.\n\nThis Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 7 August 2003.\n\nBackground: This AD is prompted by a review of thrust reverser safety analyses following a report of inadvertent thrust reverser deployment on another make and model engine. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent inadvertent in- flight thrust reverser deployment.\n\n![](image.002.png)  \n\nJim Coyne\n\nDelegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 26 June 2003\n\n![](image.001.png)  \n\nThe above AD is notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 16 July 2003.","sortOrder":1}],"analysis":{"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The directive remains consistent with its stated original purpose: prevent inadvertent in-flight thrust reverser deployment by ensuring DPV assemblies meet specified test or leak-check standards or are new. It stays narrowly targeted at the DPV assembly and imposes inspection/replacement and recurring checks; it does not expand into unrelated systems or broader regulatory domains."},"complexity_factors":["Single-component focus (directional pilot valve) keeps scope narrow","One defined term with three alternative qualification routes for 'serviceable DPV assembly'","Multiple compliance deadlines tied to different Requirement numbers (Requirement 1, 2, 3, 4) with exceptions for 3(a) and 3(b)","Cross-references to external technical documents (Middle River CMM GEK 85007 and ASB 78A5053) and to an FAA AD","Simple recurring interval (7,000 flight hours) reduces conditional complexity"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this directive does**\n\n- This Airworthiness Directive (AD) requires Airbus A330 operators to ensure the directional pilot valve (DPV) used in the thrust reverser system is ``serviceable`` and to inspect/test or replace DPV assemblies on a set schedule. The goal (as stated in the AD) is to reduce the risk of an unintended thrust reverser deployment in flight.\n\n**Who it affects**\n\n- Airlines and other operators of Airbus A330 aeroplanes, their maintenance providers (MROs), and parts suppliers for the DPV assembly. Aircraft owners/operators pay for the tests, leak checks or replacements, and must schedule maintenance and possible downtime.\n\n**What “serviceable DPV assembly” means under the AD**\n\n- A DPV assembly counts as serviceable only if one of the following is true:\n  - it is new and has accumulated zero time-since-new (TSN), or\n  - it has accumulated zero time-in-service (TIS) after passing the tests specified in the Middle River Aircraft Systems Component Maintenance Manual (GEK 85007 (78-31-51), Directional Pilot Solenoid Valve testing and troubleshooting), or\n  - it has passed a leak test in accordance with paragraph 2.B of Middle River Aircraft Systems Alert Service Bulletin ASB 78A5053 dated 30 October 2001.\n\n(Those are the three alternative mechanical conditions that qualify a DPV as serviceable for continued use under this directive.)\n\n**Required timing and actions (mechanics)**\n\n- Before an affected aircraft exceeds 7,000 flight hours TSN or 1,000 flight hours TIS after the AD takes effect, operators must comply with Requirement 1 (or 1(a)&(b)) or Requirement 2 — i.e. inspect/test or replace the DPV assembly as prescribed.\n- For Requirement 3 (except subparagraphs 3(a) and 3(b)), the same 7,000 TSN / 1,000 TIS deadline applies.\n- If Requirement 3 results in deactivation of the thrust reverser: 3(a) requires the aeroplane not to be flown (prior to further flight) until the specified condition is met; 3(b) requires a follow-up within 10 days after deactivation.\n- Thereafter, Requirement 4 requires DPV assemblies to be checked or replaced at intervals not exceeding 7,000 flight hours since the last check or replacement.\n\n**Why it matters (stated purpose and practical implications)**\n\n- The stated safety reason is to prevent inadvertent in-flight deployment of a thrust reverser, a hazardous event for jet aircraft. The AD was prompted by a review of thrust reverser safety following an inadvertent deployment reported on another engine/airframe combination.\n\n- Practical effects on operators: increased maintenance workload, required downtime to perform tests or replacement, and recurrent recurring checks at 7,000 flight-hour intervals. Operators decide whether to perform the specified tests and leak checks or to fit a zero-TSN/new DPV assembly.\n\n**Costs, incentives and trade-offs**\n\n- Who pays: aircraft operators bear direct costs (labour, parts, possible AOG [aircraft on ground] time). MROs supply the labour and approved test capabilities.\n\n- Incentives and private choices: operators may elect to replace a DPV with a new/zero-TSN unit rather than perform the manual testing if that is operationally quicker or cheaper, or if spare availability dictates the choice. Suppliers of DPVs could see increased demand for replacement assemblies.\n\n- Implementation risks and compliance burden: the AD depends on availability of approved test procedures (the referenced Component Maintenance Manual and Alert Service Bulletin) and on maintenance facilities able to carry out those tests to the required standard. Delays or limited supply of serviceable DPVs could increase aircraft downtime.\n\n- Opportunity cost: time spent on these checks/replacements displaces other scheduled maintenance activities and can affect aircraft utilisation and scheduling.\n\n**Where decision-making rests**\n\n- The directive obliges operators to comply by the stated deadlines; maintenance providers perform the technical work under the referenced manuals and service bulletin procedures. Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) enforces compliance through the AD mechanism.\n\n**Scope and limits of the measure**\n\n- The AD is narrowly focused on one component (the DPV assembly in the thrust reverser system) and prescribes testing/replacement and recurring intervals. It does not change certification standards, alter operating rules apart from the immediate safety restriction following deactivation, or mandate broader system modifications.\n\n**References used by the directive**\n\n- It references specific maintenance documents: Middle River Aircraft Systems Component Maintenance Manual GEK 85007 (78-31-51) and Middle River Aircraft Systems ASB 78A5053 (30 Oct 2001); and notes the related FAA AD (2002-06-07). These referenced documents contain the technical test procedures that make a DPV “serviceable.”\n\n**Bottom line**\n\n- The AD requires A330 operators to ensure the DPV for the thrust reverser is either new or has passed specified tests/leak checks before further use, to comply with initial deadlines (7,000 TSN / 1,000 TIS) and then at recurring 7,000-flight-hour intervals. The measure imposes maintenance costs and operational scheduling impacts on operators while aiming to reduce the risk of unintended in-flight thrust reverser deployment."},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"A positive credit balance is required for all requests, including BYOK, so fallback providers remain available. Add credits at https://vercel.com/d?to=%2F%5Bteam%5D%2F%7E%2Fai%3Fmodal%3Dtop-up to continue.","source":"analysis-cron"},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This appears to be a focused safety directive addressing a specific identified risk (inadvertent thrust reverser deployment). The scope remains tightly constrained to the Airbus A330 DPV assembly issue that prompted the original safety concern. No evidence of scope creep beyond the original airworthiness safety purpose."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple compliance pathways (Requirements 1, 2, 3, 3(a), 3(b), and 4) with different deadlines and conditions","Technical aviation terminology requiring manufacturer manual references (GEK 85007, ASB 78A5053)","Cross-reference to FAA AD 2002-06-07 indicating harmonisation with US regulations","Conditional logic based on flight hours (TSN vs TIS) and operational status (deactivated vs active thrust reversers)","Definition of 'serviceable' requires meeting one of three alternative technical conditions","Fragmentary structure — appears to be an excerpt with missing sections (Requirements 1-4 referenced but not fully reproduced)"],"plain_english_summary":"This CASA airworthiness directive mandates inspection, testing and, where required, replacement of the Directional Pilot Valve (DPV) on certain Airbus A330 thrust‑reverser systems. It targets operators and maintenance organisations to prevent inadvertent in‑flight thrust‑reverser deployment—a hazardous failure that can cause loss of control—by imposing pre‑flight and flight‑hour limits and ongoing checks."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-a330-19-thrust-reverser-directional-pilot-valve-pressure-test-replacement","history":"/api/acts/ad-a330-19-thrust-reverser-directional-pilot-valve-pressure-test-replacement/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-a330-19-thrust-reverser-directional-pilot-valve-pressure-test-replacement/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-a330-19-thrust-reverser-directional-pilot-valve-pressure-test-replacement/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-a330-19-thrust-reverser-directional-pilot-valve-pressure-test-replacement/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-a330-19-thrust-reverser-directional-pilot-valve-pressure-test-replacement/documents"}}